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Section Three of the Defense of
Marriage Act: Is Marriage
Reserved to the States?
by KmsTiAN D. WHIT1EN*
I. Introduction
The State of Louisiana recently enacted a statute creating the
"covenant marriage," a union in which "one male and one female...
agree that the marriage between them is a lifelong relationship."' The
parties to a covenant marriage sign a declaration of intent acknowl-
edging that they "understand that a Covenant Marriage is for life,"
and that they "commit [themselves] to take all reasonable efforts to
preserve [their] marriage, including marital counseling."2 Substan-
tively, a covenant marriage terminates the right under Louisiana law
to a "no fault" divorce; indeed, a non-breaching party may bring a
divorce action "only where there has been a complete and total
breach of the marital covenant."3 The option to enter a covenant
marriage is available both to couples applying for a marriage license
and to those already married. Following Louisiana's lead, at least
eighteen other states have introduced similar "covenant marriage"
laws.4
Let us suppose that Congress and the President decide that it is in
the best interest of the nation as a whole to encourage "no fault" di-
vorce. The federal government, in turn, might enact a statute denying
* LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center, 1998; J.D., University of California,
Hastings College of the Law, 1973; A.B., University of California at Davis, 1970. My
thanks to Professors Craig Goldblatt and Ernest Young for their guidance and enthusiasm,
to Judi Collins for her patience, support and word processing expertise and to my brother
Alan for his part in the publication of this Article.
1. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 272(A) (1998).
2. Id. § 273. See generally Melissa Lawton, The Constitutionality of Covenant Mar-
riage Laws, 66 FoRDH1M L. Rnv. 2471 (1998); J. Herbie DiFonzo, Alternatives to Marital
Fault: Legislative and Judicial Experiments in Cultural Change, 34 IDAHo L. RFv. 1, 56-57
(1997).
3. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 272(A).
4. See Lawton, supra note 2, at 2472 n.5.
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all federal benefits to people married under state laws that require a
showing of fault to obtain a divorce. Such a law might state:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or any rul-
ing, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative
bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word 'marriage'
means only a legal union between persons who may terminate
that legal union without a showing of fault by either party to the
legal union, and the word 'spouse' refers only to the parties to a
'marriage' as defined herein.
Does the Constitution of the United States grant the Congress and
President such power, or is the whole subject of "marriage" reserved
to the states?5 The answer to this question will rest on the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Tenth Amendment and, specifically, the
extent to which Congress can regulate the area of domestic relations.
Ratified by the states in 1789, the Constitution contemplated a
federal government of enumerated powers6 which are "few and de-
fined."'7 The powers retained by the states, on the other hand, are
"numerous and indefinite, "8 including the power to define the "mar-
riage" relationship for their citizens.9 When the Bill of Rights was
adopted by the first Congress and ratified by the states in 1791, the
Tenth Amendment further confirmed that those "powers not dele-
gated to the [federal government,] nor prohibited by [the Constitu-
tion] to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the
people."'10
In the last twenty years, however, United States Supreme Court
opinions have differed widely in their approach to the protection of
rights "reserved" to the states by the Tenth Amendment. In the late
1970s, the Court announced that the Tenth Amendment plays a "fun-
damental role" in allowing the states to "function effectively in [the]
federal system[,]" and that it was the Court's responsibility to pro-
scribe congressional action which intruded into areas "reserved to the
5. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.").
6. See, e.g, South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,218 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
7. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 236 (James Madison) (Bantam Classics ed., 1982).
Most of these powers are contained in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.
8. Id.
9. See Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 575 (1906), overruled on other grounds by
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942), ("No one denies that the States, at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution, possessed full power over the subject of marriage
and divorce [and that] the Constitution delegated no authority to the Government of the
United States on [that subject].").
10. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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States."" Fewer than ten years later, the Court rejected that ap-
proach and held that the Constitution's Framers contemplated that
Congress and the President would themselves regulate their relation-
ships with the states, without interference from the Court.' 2 More re-
cently, the Court has returned to an approach wherein, at least in
some circumstances, it determines whether or not Congress and the
President have acted properly in light of the Tenth Amendment.'"
It is in this constitutional context that, in September of 1996, Con-
gress passed and the President signed the Defense of Marriage Act
("DOMA").14 DOMA purports to prevent one state from "export-
ing" its same-sex "marriage" to another, and for the first time defines
the terms "marriage" and "spouse" for all federal laws, programs, and
actions. Though the Supreme Court has yet to review this congres-
sional attempt to regulate domestic relations, this article concludes
that Section 3 of DOMA seriously impairs a state's power to define
the "marriage" relationship for its people. It is therefore proscribed
by the Tenth Amendment.
Section two of this article provides a brief survey of the Supreme
Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. Additionally, it examines
several lower federal court opinions addressing domestic relations is-
sues and proposed constitutional amendments which relate to Con-
gress' power to enact uniform marriage and divorce laws. Section
three examines how the Supreme Court has treated cases specifically
involving domestic relations. Moreover, it explores Congress' own
constitutional authority to legislate in the area of domestic relations.
Section four introduces the DOMA, while section five looks at the
Tenth Amendment and the effect of pervasive federal regulation on
DOMA's impact. Section six is a brief analysis of the Sixteenth and
Seventeenth Amendments which underscores DOMA's unconstitu-
tionality. Finally, I conclude that, although Section 3 of the DOMA
11. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), overruled by Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), ("insofar as the challenged [Con-
gressional actions] operate to directly to displace the States' freedom to structure integral
operations in an areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not within the au-
thority granted Congress by [the Commerce Clause].").
12. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550 ("[W]e have no license to employ freestanding concep-
tions of state sovereignty when measuring congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause.") Id.
13. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996) and 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996). Congress and the President have
also enacted federal legislation related to child support (Federal Child Support Recovery
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1992)) and domestic violence (Federal Violence Against Women Act,
42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994), and 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (1994)).
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purports to define "marriage" and "spouse" only for federal pro-
grams, in practice it unconstitutionally imposes Congress' definitions
of "marriage" and "spouse" on the states.
H. The Tenth Amendment Jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court
Congress enacted and the states ratified the Tenth Amendment to
insure that the Constitution expressed the Framers' intent to grant the
federal government "few and defined" powers. 5 Indeed, the first ten
Amendments -the Bill of Rights-were meant to allay the concerns
of Anti-federalists who feared that the new federal government would
usurp the power of the states. The Tenth Amendment thus states that
"[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people."' 6
This final version of the Tenth Amendment was itself the product
of substantial controversy. During congressional debate, it was sug-
gested that the word "expressly" be added before the word "dele-
gated," so that the amendment would read, "[t]he powers not
expressly delegated by the Constitution...." James Madison objected
to this proposed change because he believed it necessary to allow the
government powers implied from the Constitution, "unless the Consti-
tution descend to recount every minutia."' 7 In light of these concerns,
Congress adopted the Tenth Amendment as it presently reads.'
8
15. THF FEDERALIST, supra note 7, at 236.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
17. 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 403 (Phillip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner eds.,
1989).
18. See John R. Vile, Truism, Tautology or Vital Principle? The Tenth Amendment
Since United States v. Darby, 27 CumB. L. RFv. 445, 450 (1997). But see W. CROSSKEY,
POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF TiE UNITED STATES 691 (1953).
Crosskey proffers that the true meaning of the Tenth Amendment was that:
a state law could be invalid under the Constitution, only if "the people of the state
had alienated to the government of the United States their whole original power
over the subject matter of the law .... The rule of construction was [that] every
power was reserved to the states that was not, either in express terms, or by nec-
essary implication, taken away from them, and vested exclusively in the federal
head."
Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). Crosskey also believes that the first eight
amendments, as originally drafted, applied to the states, unless, like the first, they specifi-
cally apply only to Congress, and that Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Barron v. Balti-
more, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), "appears to have been a sham." CRossKEY, supra at
1081.
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Alexander Hamilton provided an early opinion as to what type of
federal law would exceed the "few and defined" powers delegated to
the federal government:
The propriety of a law in a constitutional light, might always be
determined by the nature of the powers upon which it is
founded. Suppose by some forced construction of its authority
(which indeed cannot easily be imagined) the Federal Legisla-
ture should attempt to vary the law of descent in any State;
would it not be evident that in making such an attempt it had
exceeded its jurisdiction and infringed upon that of the State? 19
A. The Early Court
The early Supreme Court decisions addressing federal authority
over domestic relations treated marriage and divorce much the same
as Hamilton's example of states' "law of descent;" in dicta they denied
any federal right to regulate in that area. This power was, however,
never a bright line bar to any legislation not specifically sanctioned in
the Constitution. In McCulloch v. Maryland," for instance, Chief Jus-
tice Marshall affirmed Congress' power under the "Necessary and
Proper" Clause 2 to exercise "implied" powers, and create a Bank of
the United States. However, Justice Marshall later commented that
"[iun no single instance does the court admit the unlimited power of
congress to adopt any means whatever, and thus to pass the limits
prescribed by the constitution."'
Under Chief Justice Taney, the Court took a narrower view of
Congress' power, holding that "the commerce clause left states free to
regulate as they wished so long as their actions did not conflict with
19. THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 157 (Alexander Hamilton) (Bantam Classics ed.,
1982).
20. See Ex Parte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890).
21. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
23. Vile, supra note 18, at 454 (citing JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF McCulloch v.
Maryland 186-87 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969)). See generally Gary Larson & Patricia B.
Granger, The 'Proper' Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the
Sweeping Clause, 43 DuKE L.J. 267, 331-32 (1993) (questioning McCulloch v. Maryland,
and disagreeing with Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)); Stephen Gardbaum, Re-
thinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REv. 795, 824-26 (1996) (arguing that Con-
gress must "balance the advantages and disadvantages of its proposed course of action
from a federalism perspective," which the Court should scrutinize under the "hard look"
doctrine); William Eskridge & John Ferejohn, The Elastic Commerce Clause: A Political
Theory of Federalism, 47 VA.ND. L. Rnv. 1355, 1369-72 (1994) (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheaton) 1 (1824); McCulloch v. Maryland; Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh
Co., 27 U.S. 245 (1829), and Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheaton) 518
(1819)).
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validly enacted federal legislation."'  Even after the Civil War, and
the ratification of the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments, the Supreme
Court struck down congressional attempts to regulate privately owned
inns, public conveyances, and theaters on Tenth Amendment
grounds.25
B. The New Deal
The Great Depression prompted the federal government to enact
more expansive federal economic regulation. Eventually, the
Supreme Court validated these more robust assertions of federal
24. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 405 (1987). The Supreme
Court under Chief Justice Taney "generally allowed states to pursue local development
objectives, even in cases where the Marshall Court might have considered those objectives
to have trenched upon national authority .... " Eskridge & Ferejobn, supra note 23, at
1373 (citing The Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102 (1837); Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851); and Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420
(1837)). The authors also cite Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), as showing that
the justices "fragmented on the issue of slavery." Id. at 1375.
25. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 14-15 (1883). See also Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873) (refusing to strike down Louisiana's slaughterhouse monopoly in
New Orleans); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) (limiting the application of
the Civil Rights Act to states action). See generally Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 23, at
1376-80. Thus, it has been held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not give Congress
power to set the voting age for state elections, see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970),
nor the ability to affirmatively legislate what standard states must apply in First Amend-
ment "free exercise" cases. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The Tenth
Amendment was also invoked to strike down several federal laws which were held to be
beyond Congress' commerce power. See, e.g., The Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113
(1871), overruled by Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939) (rejecting
application of a federal tax to the income of state judges); Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S.
20 (1922) (striking down Congressional regulation of child labor); A.L.A. Schecter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating the National Industrial Recovery
Act); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (striking down the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act). In Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), the Court struck down federal
laws which purported to regulate child labor at factories which shipped manufactured
goods in interstate commerce. The Court held that child labor was a "purely local" issue
and beyond Congress' control. See iL at 276. In Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238
(1936), the Court held unconstitutional a federal law which purported to regulate the coal
industry, distinguishing between creating products and "commerce," in holding that Con-
gress' power to regulate interstate commerce did not include the power to regulate the
mining of coal.
Addressing Congress' power to lay and collect taxes, in The Collector v. Day, 78 U.S.
(11 Wall.) 113 (1871), the Court held that the post-Civil War federal income tax could not
be imposed on the salary of a state judge because if the states cannot tax instrumentalities
of the federal government, the federal government cannot tax instrumentalities of the
state. Both propositions rest "upon necessary implication[s]." ld. at 127. In reaching its
conclusion, the Court stated: "The government of the United States... can claim no pow-
ers which are not granted to it by the Constitution, and the powers actually granted must
be such as are expressly given by necessary implication." Id. at 124.
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power, and brought to a temporary end the Court's citation of the
Tenth Amendment as a curb on Congress' commerce power.26 In
Helvering v. Gerhardt,27 for instance, the Court upheld the federal in-
come tax as applied to employees of the New York Port Authority.
Justice Stone's opinion for the Court held that, since the federal tax on
the Port Authority employees did not "threaten[ ] unreasonably to ob-
struct any function essential to the continued existence of the state
government, 2z  it did not improperly invade New York's
sovereignty.29
In United States v. Darby,30 Justice Stone once again wrote for the
Court and upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act's prohibition of the
shipment in interstate commerce of goods which were produced
"under labor conditions... which fail to conform to [wage and hour]
standards set up by the Act."'" In upholding the Act, the Court held
26. See Paul J. Mishkin, The Current Understanding of The Tenth Amendment, in TI-M
BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CuRRENT UNDERSTANDING 465 (Eugene
Hickok ed., 1991). In Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), the Court held that Con-
gress' commerce power allowed it to regulate an individual farmer's production of wheat
for his family's consumption, because the cumulative effect of those farmers' home con-
sumption might "reasonably be thought to alter the supply-and-demand relationships of
the interstate commodity market." TRI, supra note 24, at 310 (citing Wickard, 317 U.S.
at 127-28). Four years later, in New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946), the Court
upheld a nondiscriminatory federal tax on mineral water sold by the State of New York,
with no opinion attracting a majority of the Court. The Court upheld the tax because it
applied to all persons, including the State, equally. See id. at 583-84 (opinion of Frank-
furter, J.). Chief Justice Stone's opinion collected four votes to uphold the tax, but he was
"not prepared to say that the national government may constitutionally lay a non-discrimi-
natory tax on every class of property and activities of States and individual alike." Id. at
586 (Stone, CJ., concurring). Justices Black and Douglas dissented on the ground that the
tax clearly violated the Tenth Amendment. See id. at 596 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice
Douglas denied the view that "the sovereign position of the States must find its protection
in the will of a transient majority of Congress," and referring to the Tenth Amendment,
stated that reciprocal state and federal tax immunity is consistent with McCulloch v. Mary-
land. IL at 594-97 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Vile, supra note 18, at 481-82. Thus,
the Court continued to permit expansion of Congress' commerce and taxing powers, but
some Justices expressed concern that federal regulation had exceeded its constitutional
limit, and that the states' sovereignty was being violated.
27. 304 U.S. 405 (1938).
28. IL at 424.
29. In Graves v. New York ex reL O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939), the Court upheld the
imposition of New York's income tax on the salary of a federal employee. The Court
upheld incorrect the assumption that an income tax burden on state or federal employees
justified "the implied Constitutional tax immunity of the government by which [the em-
ployee] is employed," and overruled The Collector v. Day. Three years later the Supreme
Court overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart and limited Carter v. Carter Coal Company. For
discussion of these three cases see supra note 25.
30. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
31. Id. at 109.
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that Congress may properly control wholly intrastate activities which
affect interstate commerce,32 and characterized the Tenth Amend-
ment as, "but a truism that all is retained which has not been surren-
dered. '33 He proceeded to state that:
There is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it
was more than declaratory of the relationship between the na-
tional and state governments as it had been established by the
Constitution before the amendment or that its purpose was
other than to allay fears that the new national government
might seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the states
might not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers. From
the beginning and for many years the amendment has been con-
strued as not depriving the national government of authority to
resort to all means for the exercise of a granted power which are
appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted end.34
Thirty-three years after Darby, the Maryland v. Wirtz35 Court up-
held an Act extending the Fair Labor Standards Act to state employ-
ees.36 Similarly, in Fry v. United States,37 the Court upheld application
to state employees of the temporary federal wage and salary controls
in the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970. While the Fry Court con-
cluded that states are not immune from all federal regulation under
the Commerce Clause because of their sovereign status,38 it noted
that:
[w]hile the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a 'tru-
ism' . . . [citing Darby] it is not without significance. The
Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that
Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the
States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a fed-
eral system.39
C. National League of Cities
In 1974, Congress again amended the Fair Labor Standards Act,
extending its provisions to all state employees. This gave a newly con-
32. See id at 122.
33. Id. at 124.
34. Id.
35. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
36. See id. Justice Douglas strenuously dissented, writing that "what is done here is ...
a serious invasion of state sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment that is in my
view not consistent with our constitutional federalism." Id. at 201 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
37. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
38. See id. at 548.
39. Id. at 547 n.7. Justice Rehnquist dissented, asserting that states have a constitu-
tional right as states "to be free from such congressionally asserted authority." Id. at 553
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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stituted Court the opportunity to overrule Maryland v. Wirtz. In Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery,4 0 Justice Rehnquist cited Justice
Marshall's majority opinion in Fry v. United States4' for the proposi-
tion that, "Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs
the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal
system."'42 He thus rejected Justice Stone's "truism" description of the
Tenth Amendment in Darby, by stating:
We have repeatedly recognized that there are attributes of sov-
ereignty attaching to every state government which may not be
impaired by Congress, not because Congress may lack an affirm-
ative grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but be-
cause the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority
in that manner.4 3
Though National League of Cities seemed to revive the Tenth
Amendment's pre-Darby prominence, subsequent opinions continued
to uphold federal regulation of state activity. In Hodel v. Virginia Sur-
face Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc.," for example, the Court up-
held a statute which regulated states' surface coal mining operations.
The Hodel Court explained that the regulations govern the activities
of only private individuals, and not the "States as States," and also
determined that states were not compelled to enforce the federal stan-
dards, so Congress had not "commandeer[ed] the legislative processes
of the States ... ,4I In Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Missis-
sippi,46 the Court upheld federal regulations requiring the states' pub-
lic utility regulating authorities to implement federal rules, and
requiring the states to consider federally-suggested energy-saving
measures. Again, the Court found that the Act only required the
states to consider the federal standards, and Congress could preempt
the field, so the federal regulations "do not threaten the States' 'sepa-
40. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985).
41. 421 U.S. 542 (1975). The Court declined to overrule Fry, citing the temporary
nature of the Federal regulations at issue there and the national economic "emergency."
National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852-53.
42. Id. at 833 (quoting Fry, 421 U.S. at 547).
43. Id. at 845. The Court signaled that it would closely scrutinize Congressional action
which affects the "States as States," and would reject legislation otherwise authorized by
the Commerce Clause which affects "functions essential to [a state's] separate and in-
dependent existence." Id. (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76
(1869)). The Court was careful to limit its holding to the Commerce Clause, leaving open
whether there were similar limitations on Congress' spending, or Fourteenth Amendment
powers. See id. at 852 n.17, 855 n.18.
44. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
45. Id. at 278-88.
46. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
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rate and independent existence." 47 Then, in EEOC v. Wyoming,4 8
the Court permitted the application to state employees of the Age
Discrimination In Employment Act. The EEOC Court once again
read National League of Cities narrowly, holding that the Act as ap-
plied did not "directly impair the States' ability 'to structure integral
operations in areas of traditional governmental functions."' 49
Nine years after providing the fifth "self-consciously doubtful"5
vote for the majority in National League of Cities, Justice Blackmun
changed his mind. He expressed this transformation in his opinion for
the Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,5
which overruled National League of Cities. Writing for the 5-4 major-
ity, Justice Blackmun wrote that National League of Cities had be-
come unworkable. Instead, Garcia held that the structure of the
federal government itself ensured the proper balance of states and
federal powers.52 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Powell expressed
concern that the majority has left virtually no limit on Congress' com-
merce power.53
D. The Rehnquist Court
Six year after Garcia, in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 4 the Court implic-
itly limited its holding. While never directly repudiating Garcia, the
majority rejected a federal prohibition on a mandatory retirement age
for state judges because Congress had not made its intention to apply
47. Id. at 765 (citing Lane County, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 76).
48. 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
49. Id. at 239 (citing Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 287-88).
50. William W. Van Alstyne, Comment, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L.
REv. 1709, 1713 (1985) ("Justice Blackmun only fretfully and barely concurred").
51. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
52. See id. at 550. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The
Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM.
L. Rav. 543 (1954). But see John C. Woo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAl.
L. REv. 1311 (1997).
53. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 560 (Powell, J., dissenting). Two other Garcia dissenters
predicted that the majority's apparently total reliance on the elected branches of govern-
ment to regulate themselves would be short lived. See id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
id at 589 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Two years after Garcia, in South Carolina v. Baker,
485 U.S. 505 (1988), the Court held that a state was precluded from judicially invoking the
Tenth Amendment unless it could assert "it was deprived of any right to participate in the
national political process or that it was singled out in a way that left it politically isolated
and powerless." Id. at 513. Justice O'Connor warned that the congressional regulation of
state bond interest at issue in Baker was dangerous, and that if this "nibbl[ing] away at
state sovereignty [went unchecked] someday essentially nothing [will be] left [of state sov-
ereignty] but a gutted shell." Id. at 533 (quoting TnmE, supra note 24, at 381).
54. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
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the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
("ADEA") "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute."'55
Thus, because judges are "important government officials" whose se-
lection is at "the heart of representative government,"56 Justice
O'Conner held that the power to determine their qualifications is "re-
served to the States under the Tenth Amendment," and part of the
Constitution's "guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government. 5 7
The next year, in New York v. United States,"8 the remaining Gar-
cia dissenters, along with newly-appointed Justices Souter and
Thomas, held unconstitutional portions of the federal Low-Level Ra-
dioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985,19 which imposed on
the states an obligation to provide for the disposal of radioactive
waste generated within their borders. The Act provided three "incen-
tives" to states in order to comply with that obligation: (1) financial
incentives which rewarded states for developing sites to receive radio-
active waste from other states; (2) "access" incentives which allowed
states with waste sites to gradually increase the cost of access to their
sites, and ultimately deny access to waste from states that do not meet
federal deadlines; and (3) "take title" incentives that require a state
which does not provide for the disposal of all internally generated ra-
dioactive waste to "take title," and become liable for all damages suf-
fered as a result of, that waste.60
The State of New York filed suit against the United States con-
tending that these "incentives" were in violation of the Tenth Amend-
ment. The Court held that while the monetary and "access"
incentives were consistent with the Tenth Amendment, the "take ti-
tle" incentives were not.6' Justice O'Connor's majority opinion noted
the Court's role in determining the limits of Congress' power under
the Tenth Amendment. Justice O'Connor stated that:
[W]hile the Tenth Amendment makes explicit that "the powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro-
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people[;]" the task of ascertaining the
55. Id. at 460. See also Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989).
56. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461.
57. Id (quoting U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4).
58. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b).
60. See New York, 505 U.S. at 152-54.
61. See id. at 185-86.
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constitutional line between federal and State power has given
rise to many of the Court's most difficult and celebrated cases.62
Noting Darby's reference to the Tenth Amendment as a "truism,
63
and Garcia's recognition that the states "retain a significant measure
of sovereign authority,"' she wrote that:
[t]he Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of the Federal
Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance,
reserve powers to the States. The Tenth Amendment thus di-
rects us to determine, as in this case, whether an incident of
State sovereignty is protected by a limitation on an Article I
power.65
Since New York did not involve congressional subjection of states to
generally applicable laws, the Court had no occasion to revisit its
holding in Garcia.66
In striking down the "take title" incentives, the Court reiterated
that "Congress may not simply 'commandeer the legislative processes
of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a fed-
eral regulatory program."' 67 Justice O'Connor reasoned that "[a]
choice between two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques
is no choice at all." ' She noted that even Garcia admitted that the
Tenth Amendment set some limits on Congress' power to compel
states to regulate on behalf of federal interests, 69 and that allowing the
federal government to "commandeer" the states diminishes the ac-
countability of both state and federal officials. Accordingly, Justice
O'Connor stated that:
[W]here the Federal Government directs the States to regulate,
it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disap-
proval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory
program may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications
of their decision. Accountability is thus diminished when, due
to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in ac-
cordance with the views of the local electorate in matters not
pre-empted by federal regulation.7'
Justice O'Connor continued to write that:
62. Id. at 155.
63. Id at 156.
64. Id. (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549 (1985)).
65. Id. at 157.
66. See id. at 160.
67. Id. at 161 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452
U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
68. Id at 175-76 (citing Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288).
69. See id. at 162.
70. Id. at 169.
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Some truths are so basic that, like the air around us, they are
easily overlooked.... But the Constitution protects us from our
own best intentions. It divides power among sovereigns and
among branches of government precisely so that we may resist
the temptation to concentrate power in one location as an expe-
dient solution to the crisis of the day .... States are not mere
political subdivisions of the United States. State governments
are neither regional offices nor administrative agencies of the
Federal Government. The positions occupied by state officials
appear nowhere on the Federal Government's most detailed or-
ganizational chart. The Constitution instead "leaves to the sev-
eral States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty," reserved
explicitly to the States by the Tenth Amendment.7
Less than three years later, in United States v. Lopez,72 the Court
held that Congress had legislated beyond its commerce power when it
enacted the provision of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,
which made it a Federal offense for "any individual knowingly to pos-
sess a firearm at a place that individual knows, or has reasonable
cause to believe, is a school zone. '73 In Lopez, Alfonso Lopez, a 12th
grade student at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, was con-
victed of possessing a handgun and five bullets.74 Lopez challenged
his conviction by arguing that the statute under which he was con-
victed "exceeded Congress' power to legislate under the Commerce
Clause."7 Though it noted Congress' broad power under the Com-
merce Clause, the Court agreed that the statute under which Lopez
was convicted "has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of eco-
nomic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms.
7 6
In a footnote, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that when President
Bush signed the Act, he stated his belief that the section under which
Lopez was convicted "inappropriately overrides legitimate state fire-
arms laws with a new and unnecessary Federal law."77 He maintained
that "when Congress criminalizes conduct already denounced as crim-
inal by the States, it effects 'change in the sensitive relation between
federal and state criminal jurisdiction."' 78
Commenting on the Court's role in Tenth Amendment challenges
to acts of Congress, Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion noted
71. Id. at 187-88.
72. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
73. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1994).
74. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552.
75. IdL
76. Id.
77. Id. at 561 n.3.
78. Id.
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that "one conclusion that could be drawn from The Federalist Papers
is that the balance between national and state power is entrusted in its
entirety to the political process."79 But, he concluded that "the ab-
sence of structural mechanisms to require those [elected] officials to
undertake this principled task, and the momentary political conven-
ience often attendant upon their failure to do so, argue against a com-
plete renunciation of the judicial role."8
Two years later, in Printz v. United States,"' the five Justices who
decided Lopez struck down provisions of the Brady Hand Gun Vio-
lence Prevention Act (the "Brady Bill").82 The Brady Bill com-
manded state law enforcement officers to perform background checks
and file reports concerning prospective hand gun purchasers.8 3 The
Court held that the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution "permit[ted
the] imposition of an obligation on state judges to enforce federal pre-
scriptions, insofar as those prescriptions related to matters appropri-
ate for the judicial power."'  However, relying on its holding in New
York, the Court in Printz "conclude[d] categorically... [that] [t]he
Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or adminis-
ter a federal regulatory program."85 Justice Scalia's majority opinion
in Printz concluded that the Framers of the Constitution "rejected the
concept of a central government that would act upon and through the
States, and instead designed a system in which the State and Federal
Governments would exercise concurrent authority over the people-
who were, in Hamilton's words, 'the only proper objects of govern-
ment."' 86 Justice Scalia further concluded that the structural separa-
tion between the states and the federal government "reduces the risk
of tyranny and abuse from either front." 87
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas asserted his "revisionist
view" that:
Although this Court has long interpreted the Constitution as
ceding Congress extensive authority to regulate commerce (in-
terstate or otherwise), I continue to believe that we must "tem-
per our Commerce Clause jurisprudence" and return to an
79. Id. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 577-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
81. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
82. 18 U.S.C. § 922.
83. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 903.
84. Id. at 907.
85. Id. at 933 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992)).
86. Id. at 919-20.
87. IL at 921 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
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interpretation better rooted in the Clause's original
understanding.88
Thus, the current majority of the Supreme Court appears to have re-
jected Garcia's rationale that protection of the powers reserved to the
states by the Tenth Amendment is best left entirely to the elected
branches of the Federal government.
HI. The Supreme Court and the Specific Case of
Domestic Relations
Does the fact that Congress has purported to limit its definitions
of "marriage" and "spouse" in Section 3 of the DOMA to federal law
exempt it from Tenth Amendment scrutiny? Can Congress define
marriage at all, when the Framers of the Constitution so clearly be-
lieved that marriage was reserved to the states? Asked another way:
do Congress' "few and defined" powers, such as its power to tax and
spend allow it to undermine state marriage laws? To answer these
questions it is important to review how the Court has treated cases
specifically involving issues of domestic relations.
A. The Tenth Amendment and the Domestic Relations Exception
Though the Supreme Court's Tenth Amendment rulings have not
expressly declared "off limits" any particular category of state regula-
tion, they have in a variety of cases suggested that the area of domes-
88. Id. at 937 (Thomas, J., concurring). See Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir.
1998) (holding that the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725
(1994), ("DPPA") enacted under the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to regulate dissemination and use of information contained in state motor
vehicle records, is not a law of general applicability under Garcia (Commerce Clause), and
does not protect a recognized constitutional right (Fourteenth Amendment). Thus, the
DPPA violates the Tenth Amendment and is unconstitutional). See also Oklahoma v.
Reno, 161 F.3d 126 (10th Cir. 1998) (DPPA upheld as valid exercise of Congress' com-
merce power); Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998) (DPPA upheld); Pierce v.
King, 918 F. Supp. 932 (E.D.N.C. 1996), affd, 131 F.3d 136 (4th Cir. 1997), vacated and
remanded, 119 S. Ct. 33 (1998) (Congress does not have power under either the Commerce
Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment to create a federal cause of action under the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, ("ADA"), for inmates in state prisons). In
Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998), the decision that led to
Pierce v. King being vacated and remanded, the Supreme Court expressly reserved the
question of whether application of the ADA to state prisons is constitutional exercise of
Congress' Commerce Clause or Fourteenth Amendment powers. See id. See generally
Amos v. Maryland Dep't of Public Safety, 126 F.3d 528 (4th Cir. 1997), vacated and re-
manded, 118 S. Ct. 2339 (1998); Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267 (9th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 2340 (1998). See also Emily Alexander, The Americans With Disabilities
Act and State Prisons: A Question of Statutory Interpretation, 66 FopD-Am L. REv. 2233
(1998).
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tic relations is reserved to the states. The early case of In re Burrus89
is a notable example of this approach. In Burrus, a district court
granted a writ of habeas corpus to the father of a child held by his
grandparents. After the grandfather refused to return the child, the
court held him in contempt and imprisoned him. The grandfather ap-
pealed the contempt citation, contending that the district court had no
jurisdiction to issue the writ in the first place. The Supreme Court
agreed, holding that "[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of
husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the states
and not to the laws of the United States." 90
In the 1906 case Haddock v. Haddock,91 a New York State court
refused to give full faith and credit to a Connecticut divorce judgment
which the husband had obtained without personal service on the wife.
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the wife was not "construc-
tively present" in Connecticut, and therefore that the Connecticut
court did not acquire jurisdiction over her.' In the course of its
lengthy decision, the Court noted that:
[n]o one denies that the states, at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, possessed full power over the subject of marriage
and divorce. . . . [Moreover], it must be conceded that the
Constitution delegated no authority to the government of the
United States on the subject of marriage and divorce.9
The 1930 case Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler94 concerned a
Romanian diplomat who claimed that the Ohio State courts did not
have jurisdiction over his divorce proceedings, because Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution vests jurisdiction over all proceedings
involving "Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Counsels" exclu-
sively in the federal courts. Citing Burrus, Justice Holmes held that
neither Article III nor the federal jurisdictional statutes granted fed-
89. 136 U.S. 586 (1890).
90. Id. at 593-94. Recently, in Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 848 (1997), the Court
cited Burrus with approval.
91. 201 U.S. 562 (1906), overruled on other grounds by Williams v. North Carolina, 317
U.S. 287 (1942).
92. Haddock, 201 U.S. at 572.
93. Id. at 575. The actual holding in Haddock was overruled in Williams v. North
Carolina, which held that a state court may, when acting in accordance with procedural due
process, grant a judgment of divorce against an absent spouse, and that judgment is enti-
tled to full faith and credit in another state. The Court there did not reach the question of
whether North Carolina could refuse to recognize another state's divorce judgment if a
North Carolina court found that the divorcing party was not properly domiciled in the
sister state. That question was answered in the affirmative in Williams v. North Carolina,
325 U.S. 226 (1945). See generally Lynn D. Wardle, Williams v. North Carolina, Divorce
Recognition and Same Sex Marriage Recognition, 32 CriGHToN L. REv. 187 (1998).
94. 280 U.S. 379 (1930).
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eral courts jurisdiction over a divorce proceeding.95 He observed that,
although the language of the Constitution and federal jurisdictional
statutes were "pretty sweeping, '' 96 it "must be taken to refer to ordi-
nary civil proceedings and not to include what formerly would have
belonged to the ecclesiastical Courts."97 Indeed, "[ilf when the Con-
stitution was adopted the common understanding was that the domes-
tic relations of husband and wife and parent and child were matters
reserved to the States, there is no difficulty in construing the instru-
ment accordingly and not much in dealing with the statutes.
98
United States v. Lopez 99 further illustrates Congress' lack of au-
thority over domestic relations. In Lopez, the Court struck down a
statute which made it a federal offense for any individual to knowingly
possess a firearm in a school zone. It is essential to note that Chief
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, Justice Thomas' concurring
opinion, and Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion all stated that the reg-
ulation of domestic relations is reserved to the states.1°° Although
these references are dicta, they suggest that all of the current mem-
bers of the Supreme Court believe that domestic relations is an area
of law which the Framers believed was among the "numerous and in-
definite" powers reserved to the states. 0 1 Indeed, Justice Thomas ex-
95. See id. at 383.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 384.
98. Id. at 383-84. See also Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 363 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) ("[G]overnmental power over domestic relations is not given to the central
government."); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1877) ("The State... has absolute
right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens
shall be created").
99. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
100. See id. at 564-65 (Rehnquist, CJ.); see id. at 585 (Thomas, J., concurring); see id. at
624 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA.
L. REv. 1787, 1789 (1995) (concluding that, "[Lopez united the Court] around the principle
that family law constitutes a clearly defined realm of exclusive state regulatory
authority.").
101. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L.
REv. 1297 (1998). Using a definition of "family law" much broader than the "domestic
relations" addressed by the Supreme Court, Professor Hasday argues that Reconstruction
and the Fourteenth Amendment provided a "consensus that the federal government had
jurisdiction over family law." Id. at 1350. She suggests that sexism may be at the root of
Lopez's "sing[ling] out family law as indissolubly, trans-historically equated with the
states[,J" because "[t]he past shows us how the language of federalism can mask a dis-
course about status ... ." Id. at 1399.
By defining "family law" to "include[ ] some of the rights that particularly concerned
the congressional authors of Reconstruction .... [,J" id. at 1372, Professor Hasday ex-
pands her definition well beyond that of the Supreme Court's: "the domestic relations of
husband and wife, parent and child." 1d at 1309 (citing Ex Parte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586,593-
94 (1890)). Her argument that the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress plenary power
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plicitly wrote that "the power to regulate 'commerce' can by no means
encompass authority... to regulate marriage .... Our Constitution
quite properly leaves such matters to the individual States, notwith-
standing those activities' effects on interstate commerce. "102
Professor Sharon Rush has further argued that Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins"' 3 rejection of a federal "common law" for diversity
cases also places domestic relations beyond Congress' reach. 0 As
Rush states, if the Tenth Amendment proscribes any areas of law to
Congress, domestic relations would surely be among them.0 5
The Court has not, however, been consistent in applying its pro-
cedural "domestic relations exception" to federal court jurisdiction.
In the 1992 case of Ankenbrandt v. Richards,106 for instance, the Court
held that a district court was not foreclosed from exercising diversity
jurisdiction in a tort action brought by a mother and children against
the ex-husband/father. According to the Court, "[Article HI of] the
Constitution does not exclude domestic relations cases from the juris-
diction otherwise granted by statute to the federal courts."'0 7 How-
ever, under Erie such diversity actions are decided based upon state
law.
B. Federal Law and the Definition of Marriage
The few cases that directly concern federal attempts to effect
states' marriage laws present an unclear precedent. In Cleveland v.
United States, °8 the Court upheld the convictions of polygamous men
for transporting their "wives" across state lines in violation of the
over "family law" is at odds with the Supreme Court's treatment of that Fourteenth
Amendment power "as corrective or preventative, not definitional," see City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 525 (1997), and ignores comments by state and federal legislators
during the ratification process which undercut her broad reading of that Amendment's
reach. See also Kristian D. Whitten, Religious Freedom and the Fourteenth Amendment
Justice Bradley's Twentieth Century Legacy, 29 CuMB. L. Rv. 143 (1998). The Supreme
Court has declined to consider such Congressional comments in determining the Four-
teenth Amendment's impact on state domestic relations law, finding them "at best...
inconclusive." Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
102. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585 (Thomas, J., concurring).
103. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
104. See Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Domestic Relations Law: Federal Jurisdiction and State
Sovereignty In Perspective, 60 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 16 (1984).
105. See id. at 18.
106. 504 U.S. 689 (1992).
107. Id. at 695. See Nasca v. Peoplesoft (In re Nasca), 160 F.3d 578 (9th Cir. 1999)
(concerning a state divorce action removed to federal court under the Federal Employee
Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (1996) ("ERISA")).
108. 329 U.S. 14 (1946).
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Mann Act,1 9 which made it a federal crime to transport a female
across state lines for "immoral purposes." Though Justice Douglas'
opinion for the Court recognized that regulation of the marriage rela-
tionship was a state matter, he found that Congress' exercise of its
"plenary" power to regulate interstate commerce only incidentally in-
terfered with this right. He thus held that the Mann Act was constitu-
tionally permissible."' In Cleveland, the Court drew a distinction
between Congress' power to regulate the interstate aspects of domes-
tic relations, and the states' power to define those relationships.
Rather than regulating the interstate aspects of a state-defined
marriage, DOMA purports to define marriage for all federal pro-
grams. Does Congress also have that "plenary" power? The cases
which have held that the "whole subject of... domestic relations...
belongs to the laws of the states""' suggest that while Congress may
regulate the interstate effects of domestic relations, it may not impose
its own definition of marriage on the states. Because Section 3 of the
DOMA has the practical effect of doing just that, it amounts to an
unconstitutional condition attached to federal funds and has the un-
constitutional effect of "commandeering" state officers and functions.
Twenty years after Cleveland, in Loving v. Virginia,"2 the
Supreme Court reversed the state law convictions of an African-
American woman and a White man who had violated Virginia's statu-
tory ban on interracial marriages. The Court rejected the State's argu-
ment that the anti-miscegenation law applied equally to Blacks and
Whites, holding that "[t]he clear and central purpose of the Four-
teenth Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of invidi-
ous racial discrimination in the States, 11 3 and that "[u]nder our
Constitution, the freedom to marry or not to marry, a person of an-
other race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the
State. 11 4 However, Congress' power under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment "[does] not authorize [it] to pass 'general legislation upon the
rights of the citizens .... .',Is Thus, whether or not Congress agrees
with a state's definition of "marriage," absent a Supreme Court hold-
ing that a state's marriage laws violate the Constitution, the Four-
109. 18 U.S.C. § 398 (1910).
110. See Cleveland, 329 U.S. at 19.
111. Ex Parte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890).
112. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
113. Id. at 10.
114. Id. at 12.
115. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 525 (1997) (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3, 13-14 (1883)).
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teenth Amendment does not give it the power to define that
relationship for the states.1 16
Several federal appellate courts have also addressed congres-
sional legislation which affects marriage. In Anetekhai v. Immigration
& Naturalization Service,1 7 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
rejected a claim that Section 5(b) of the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendments of 1986118 had the effect of regulating marriages in Lou-
isiana. Section 5(b) requires that an alien must be married to the U.S.
resident outside of the United States for at least two years before the
federal government will grant him or her "immediate relative sta-
tus."" 9 The Court of Appeals found that the two-year residency re-
quirement "does not in any way affect the legal status of... marriage
under state law."' 2 ° Thus, it does not purport to define or regulate
"marriage," but only the scope of federal benefits arising out of a state
law marriage, pursuant to Congress' express constitutional power to
regulate immigration and naturalization.' 2' Section 3 of the DOMA,
however, goes much further by defining "marriage" and "spouse" for
all federal programs. Moreover, the coercive effect of those defini-
tions in areas where they are inconsistent with state definitions will be
much greater than the INS regulations challenged in Anetekhai.
Other federal appellate courts have upheld congressional regula-
tion of the interstate effects of child support 22 and domestic vio-
lence"z against Tenth Amendment challenges. However, one en banc
federal circuit court has struck down congressional legislation pro-
scribing violence against women, where the essential elements of the
116. See id. at 527.
117. 876 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1989).
118. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(h) (1986).
119. Id.
120. Anetekhai, 876 F.2d at 1224.
121. See U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 4; see also Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977)
("over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is
over the admission of aliens."). See also Hasday, supra note 101, at 1379-80 (citing exam-
ples of immigration law's intrusion into "family law.").
122. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 121 F.3d 615 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Parker, 108 F.3d 28 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996);
United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101 (2nd Cir. 1996). See also United States v. Ballek, 1999
Daily Journal DAR 2325 (9th Cir. 1999) (Federal Child Support Recovery Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 228, upheld against Thirteenth Amendment challenge). See generally Federal Full Faith
and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (1996), and Federal Parental
Kidnapping Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1998).
123. See generally United States v. Bailey, 112 F.3d 758 (4th Cir. 1997). See also United
States v. Page, 167 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 1999) (equally divided en banc court affirmed convic-
tion under the Federal Violence Against Women Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2261).
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wrongful conduct did not directly involve interstate commerce. 124
That court cited the Tenth Amendment in holding that the challenged
federal law "assumes a general power to regulate health and safety-
the very essence of the sort of police power the Constitution denies to
the federal government and reserves to the States,"'" and "for objec-
tives unquestionably laudable, [Congress] sought to reach conduct
quintessentially within the exclusive purview of the States."' 26
C. Congress and Domestic Relations
Evidence of Congress' Constitutional authority to legislate in the
area of domestic relations is not limited to Supreme Court decisions.
Congress itself has addressed the issue of its power to legislate in the
area of marriage and divorce. Although Congress has proposed sev-
enty'2 7 constitutional amendments which would have empowered it to
enact uniform, national marriage and divorce laws, none of those ef-
forts have succeeded.'2
This outcome suggests that Congress has doubted its constitu-
tional authority to enact legislation concerning domestic relations. 29
In an 1892 report rejecting one of these proposed Constitutional
amendments, the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representa-
tives assumed that Congress did not have the power to legislate in the
area of marriage and divorce. Indeed, the report found that if Con-
124. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999).
The Court held that Congress exceeded its commerce and Fourteenth Amendment en-
forcement powers in "this most traditional area of State concern .... " Id. at 843.
125. Id at 851.
126. Id. at 889. An analogous federal statute proscribing "violence" against women, the
Mann Act has been held to be a constitutional exercise of Congress' Commerce Power.
See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 19 (1946). Its legislative history, however,
makes clear Congress' awareness that intrastate "violence" against women is "within the
proper and exclusive domain of state law." United States v. Beach, 324 U.S. 193, 198
(1945) (Murphy, J., dissenting). See also Doe v. Hartz, 134 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 1998). See
also Doe v. Mercer, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2010, at *7 (D. Mass. 1999) (citing U.S. district court
opinions upholding the constitutionality of the VAWA). At least one U.S. district court has
upheld the VAWA (referring to it as the Gender-Motivated Violence Act) in the context of
spousal abuse during marriage. See Ziegler v. Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. Wash.
1998).
127. See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1947); Proposed Amendments to the Consti-
tution of the United States Introduced In Congress From December 4, 1889-July 2, 1926
(U.S. Gov't. Printing Office, 1926).
128. See Sherrer, 334 U.S. at 364-66 n.13 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
129. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689,712,711-13 (1992) (Blackmun, J., con-
curring) (construing Congressional action in light of Ohio ex reL Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S.
379 (1930), as suggesting that Congress' failure to include domestic relations actions among
those the federal courts can hear on diversity grounds, "as simply a construction of the
diversity statute.").
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gress were given such power "it would soon undertake to legislate
upon the main body of domestic and local interests of the people
which have always belonged to and been exercised by the States."'130
The Committee's Minority Report expressed concern that men would
be able to legally marry more than once by virtue of different state
marriage and divorce laws.' 3 1 Thus, they believed that the compelling
need for uniform laws "that fix and determine the status of the citi-
zens of the nation in this most important and sacred particular .... "
offset the proposed amendment's "infringe[ment] upon the present
rights of the States."' 32 Yet even the minority conceded that "[w]hen
the Constitution was adopted it was not contemplated by its framers
that such a diversity of statutes as are now found would exist in the
various States on the subject of marriage and divorce.' 133 Thus, both
the majority and minority of that House Judiciary Committee as-
sumed that the Constitution would need to be amended before Con-
gress could properly legislate on the subject of marriage and divorce.
IV. Defense of Marriage Act
On September 21, 1996, President Clinton signed the Defense of
Marriage Act ("DOMA") into law.'34 DOMA was essentially a Con-
gressional response to the opinion of two members of the five judge
Hawaii Supreme Court who suggested that Hawaii's State constitution
requires the recognition of same-sex marriages. 31 The Judiciary
Committee of the House of Representatives stated that the DOMA
has two primary purposes: "(1) [to] defend the institution of tradi-
tional heterosexual marriage; and (2) [to] protect the right of States to
formulate their own public policy regarding legal recognition of same-
130. H.R. REP. No. 1290, at 1 (1892). The Committee also found that Congress had
more than enough to do:
The jurisdiction of Congress is already so extended that if the two Houses were to
sit in continuous session it would be quite impossible to pass upon all the bills
which are now presented. There would be more wisdom in an amendment to the
Constitution remitting to the States some of the powers now exercised by
Congress ....
Id.
131. See id. at 3-6. The specter of abandoned women and children, and multiple wives
and sets of children making claims to a man's estate did not persuade the majority of the
Committee to report the Bill to the full House.
132. Id. at 5.
133. Id. at 3.
134. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C; 1 U.S.C. § 7. See generally Scott Ruskay-Kidd, The Defense of
Marriage Act and The Overextension Of Congressional Authority, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1435
(1997).
135. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (opinion of Levinson, J.).
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sex marriages." '136 In his opening statement before the Senate Judici-
ary Committee, the Chairman of that Committee stated:
The Defense of Marriage Act would accomplish two goals: First,
it would make clear that one State's definition of marriage need
not be accepted by other States; second, the Defense of Mar-
riage Act also would define the term "marriage" for purposes of
Federal law as meaning only the legal union between one man
and one woman as husband and wife. That definition would
preclude any court from construing Federal law as treating
same-sex unions as a "marriage."' 37
Section 2 of the DOMA states:
No State, Territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian
tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record or
judicial proceeding of any other State, Territory, possession or
tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex
that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State,
territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from
such relationship.' 38
Section 3 of the DOMA states:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or any rul-
ing, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative
bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word 'marriage'
means only a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a person
of the opposite sex who is a husband or wife.' 39
During its hearings on DOMA, the House Judiciary Committee
devoted considerable attention to Section 2, which was enacted pursu-
ant Congress' authority under the "full faith and credit" clause to
"prescribe the Manner in which ... Acts, Records, and Proceedings
[of one state] shall be proved, and the Effect thereof [in another
state]." 40 The Committee found that "[t]he fact that [several] States
are sufficiently concerned about their ability to defend their marriage
laws against the threat posed by the Hawaii situation is enough to
persuade the Committee that federal legislation is warranted."'' In
his opening statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Sena-
tor Hatch indeed stated that:
136. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 2 (1996) reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.N. 2905, 2906 (here-
inafter House Report).
137. The Defense of Marriage Act Hearing on S. 1740 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 1 (1996) (opening statement of Honorable Orrin G. Hatch) (herein-
after Hatch Statement).
138. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C.
139. 1 U.S.C. § 7.
140. U.S. CONsr. art. IV, § 1.
141. House Report, supra note 136, at 10.
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The Defense Of Marriage Act ensures that each state can define
for itself the concept of marriage and not be bound by decisions
made by other States. The Defense Of Marriage Act also makes
clear that no Federal law should be read to treat a same-sex
union as a "marriage. ' ', 41
This article focuses, however, on the question of whether Con-
gress was within its constitutional power when it enacted Section 3 of
the DOMA, defining "marriage" and "spouse" for purposes of "any
Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation or interpretation of the
various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States.'
' 43
This article does not focus on Section 2, by which Congress purports
to exercise its power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to desig-
nate which state judgments must be granted full faith and credit by
sister states. 44
142. Hatch Statement, supra note 137, at 2.
143. 1 U.S.C. § 7.
144. Some opponents of Section 2 of the DOMA, argue that it is unnecessary because
states already have constitutional authority to reject a sister state's same-sex marriage as
being against its public policy. See, e.g., Ruskay-Kidd, supra note 134, at 1438-40 (the Full
Faith and Credit Clause does not play "a formal, explicit role in the treatment of extra state
marriages" because a marriage is a "license" rather than a "judgment"); The Defense of
Marriage Act: Hearing on S. 1740 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong.
42-48 (1996) (statement of Professor Cass R. Sunstein). Others contend it is "plainly un-
constitutional." 142 CONG. REc. S 5931-33 (June 6, 1996) (letter from Professor Laurence
Tribe); see Ruskay-Kidd, supra note 134, at 1466-67. Ruskay-Kidd states that:
Radical changes in the relations between states, and in the lives of individuals,
could result if the Full Faith and Credit Clause is interpreted to allow Congress a
'discretionary power to carve out such exceptions as it deems appropriate.' To
the extent that Congress does possess an untapped power to enact full faith and
credit legislation, its power must be limited.
Id. Enforcement of Section 2 may also be held to violate the constitutional "privacy" right
found to exist in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and/or the equal protection
clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments under Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967). See also The Defense of Marriage Act Hearing on H.R. 3396 Before the Subcom-
mittee on the Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 104th
Cong. 9-31 (1996) (statement of Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund).
Supporters of Section 2 view it as a constitutional exercise of Congress' power under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See also The Defense of Marriage Act. Hearing on S.
1740 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 29-32 (statement of Professor
Lynn D. Wardle); Leonard G. Brown III, Constitutionally Defending Marriage: The De-
fense of Marriage Ac4 Romer v. Evans and the Cultural Battle They Represent, 19 CANM-
BELL L. REv. 159, 172 (1996). Since no state has yet recognized same-sex marriages the
question has not, and may never, become ripe. The real effect of the DOMA may be to
keep states from recognizing same-sex marriage for fear of running afoul of the glacial
federal taxing and spending bureaucracy. Since all federal taxes and benefits are now tied
to a federal definition of "marriage" in Section 3 of the DOMA, Section 2 may become
irrelevant.
If Congress chooses to disfavor Louisiana's "covenant marriage" law, it may be a
more likely casualty of Section 2 of the DOMA, since it purports to establish a prohibition
Winter 1999] IS MARRIAGE RESERVED TO THE STATES? 443
Although most of the legislative history in the Senate and House
focuses on Section 2 of the DOMA, Professor Lynn D. Wardle of the
Law School at Brigham Young University provided testimony and
statements to both the House and Senate Judiciary Committees re-
garding Section 3. He emphasized that states have "the sole and ex-
clusive authority to regulate domestic relations within the state, ' 145
and that "[I]f Congress were attempting to impose the definition of
"marriage" upon the states, to make them use that definition in their
marriage and domestic relations laws, a serious constitutional issue
would arise."' 46
The House Judiciary Committee's report, which seems to heed
this warning, states:
The most important aspect of Section 3 is that it applies to fed-
eral law only; in the words of the statute, these definitions apply
only "[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or
any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various adminis-
trative bureaus and agencies of the United States."1 47
That report concludes:
If Hawaii or some other State eventually recognizes homosexual
"marriage," Section 3 will mean simply that "marriage" will not
be recognized as a "marriage" for purposes of Federal law.
Other than this narrow Federal requirement, the Federal gov-
ernment will continue to determine marital status in the same
manner it does under current law. Whether and to what extent
benefits available to married couples under state law will be
available to homosexual couples is purely a matter of state law,
and Section 3 in no way affects that question.' 41
The House Judiciary Committee's conclusion that Section 3 is a
"narrow Federal requirement" is puzzling in light of the pervasive na-
ture and supremacy of federal regulation. Characterizing Section 3 of
the DOMA as a "narrow Federal requirement" is like calling a federal
tax on all state marriage licenses "constitutionally insignificant." 14 9
The reasoning belies the statute's effect on all federal laws and regula-
on "no fault" divorce for couples who agree to be in a "covenant marriage." A spouse in
such a marriage may try to "export" the "covenant marriage" agreement if his/her spouse
files for divorce in another state. See generally Mark Strasser, Baker and Some Recipies for
Disaster: On DOMA, Covenant Marriages, and Full Faith and Credit Jurisprudence, 64
BROOK. L. REv. 307 (1998).
145. Wardle Statement, supra note 144, at 37.
146. Id. at 39.
147. House Report, supra note 136, at 30 (quoting H.R. 3396, 104th Cong. § 3 (1996)).
148. Id. at 31; see also James Donovan, DOMA: An Unconstitutional Establishment of
Fundamentalist Christianity, 4 MicH. J. GENDER & LAWv 335 (1997).
149. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) (holding that "given the basic
position of the marriage relationship in this society's hierarchy of values [,]" a state may
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tions, which, in turn, substantially affect all states and virtually all
Americans. As one recent critic of the DOMA points out:
Ultimately, the evaluation of DOMA requires an exercise of
judgment about the appropriate Federal and state roles in regu-
lating marriage. Recent years have witnessed an increasing fed-
eralization of domestic relations as Congress has become more
conscious of the way social legislation can effectuate family pol-
icy. This trend raises the question: Are there core aspects of
state family law which the Federal government cannot
displace? 5 °
V. DOMA, Federal Regulation, and Comandeering
The DOMA is just one example of a continuing congressional
effort to control actions of the states. For more than thirty years Con-
gress has been "federalizing" state governments and laws in a process
that has "[obligated] subnational legislators and executive officials to
enact statutes or adopt administrative regulations according to the de-
sign and standards set by the federal government.' '1 51
Before DOMA, in cases where domestic relations issues have im-
pacted federal benefits, the Supreme Court has always relied upon the
states' domestic relations law to determine the underlying domestic
relationship. In De Sylva v. Ballentine,52 for example, the Court held
that state law should decide whether an illegitimate child falls within
the definition of "child" for purposes of a federal copyright statute. 53
not constitutionally deny indigents who cannot pay the filing fee the right to sue for
divorce).
150. Ruskay-Kidd, supra note 134, at 1475 (citation omitted). The one federal circuit
court opinion which cites DOMA is Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1110 (11th Cir. 1997),
on rehearing, 120 F.3d 211 (1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 693 (1998). Shahar upheld the
Georgia Attorney General's right to withdraw a job offer made to a female lawyer, when
he learned she had participated in a "marriage" ceremony with another woman. The court
cited the fact that DOMA was supported by both of Georgia's U.S. Senators, and ten of its
twelve Members of the House of Representatives as confirming the "Attorney General's
sense that Georgia's people, in general, are set against equating in some way a relationship
between persons of the same sex with traditional marriage .... ." Id. at 1110 n.24. The
court also noted that Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), upheld Georgia's statute
criminalizing homosexual sodomy, and the fact that Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996),
did not limit, or even cite, Bowers. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1110 n.25. Since Shahar, the
Georgia Supreme Court has held that Georgia's sodomy statute, as applied to the private
acts of consenting adults, is unconstitutional. See Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998).
See also Miller v. Vesta, 946 F. Supp. 697, 711-12 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (citing DOMA as a
congressional expression of repugnance toward homosexuality).
151. Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79
COLUM. L. RPv. 847, 870 (1979).
152. 351 U.S. 570 (1955).
153. Id. at 580.
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In De Sylva, the Court determined that the illegitimate child of an
author was a "child" of that author under state law, and was therefore
able to take advantage of the Federal Copyright Act's provision grant-
ing the children of a deceased author the right to renew a copyright. 154
The Court stated that "[t]his does not mean that a State would be
entitled to use the word 'children' in a way entirely strange to those
familiar with its ordinary usage, but at least to the extent that there
are permissible variations in the ordinary concept of 'children' we
deem state law controlling.' 155
De Sylva suggests that the Court might deem it permissible for
Congress to exclude people who had been married for a limited
amount of time from benefits under the copyright laws, but since the
making and administration of copyright laws is one of the "few and
defined" powers' 56 expressly delegated to Congress by the Constitu-
tion, 57 such congressional action would be consistent with the Fram-
ers' intent. However, if the effect of the congressional statute was
tantamount to compelling the states to adopt Congress' definition of
"marriage," the Tenth Amendment would clearly be implicated.
The De Sylva Court did not address that issue, nor does it appear
that a contrary holding in that case would have seriously impacted
state domestic relations law. The number of copyright holders' chil-
dren is not significant enough to coerce states to adopt a federal defi-
nition of "child." Furthermore, it is insignificant compared to the
millions of people impacted by the DOMA's new definitions of "mar-
riage" and "spouse" in the 3,900 federal laws and regulations
affected. 58
In United States v. Yazell,159 the Court determined that state do-
mestic relations law would decide whether a wife was liable on a Fed-
eral Small Business Administration loan taken out by her husband, 6 °
expressly reserving the question of Congress' power to override state
domestic relations law.' 6' In Yazell, a Texas man had taken out a dis-
aster loan from the Federal Small Business Administration ("SBA"),
but died before it was fully paid off. The SBA attempted to collect the
balance from his widow, but she pleaded that Texas law precluded her
154. See id.
155. IdL at 581.
156. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 7, at 236.
157. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
158. See House Report, supra note 136, at 10.
159. 382 U.S. 341 (1956).
160. See id. at 352-53.
161. See id. at 352.
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from becoming obligated on a contract without her first obtaining a
court decree removing her disability to contract, which she had not
done. The Supreme Court held that Texas law controlled, and Mrs.
Yazell was not liable on her late husband's SBA contract. The Court
stated that "We decide only that this Court, in the absence of specific
Congressional action, should not decree in this situation that imple-
mentation of federal interests requires overriding the particular state
rule involved here."162
The Court did not consider "the question of the constitutional
power of the Congress to override state law in these circumstances by
direct legislation."'163 In those cases where the Court has held distri-
bution of federal benefits to be governed by federal law,' 64 neither
Congress nor the Court has questioned the state law determination of
the parties' marital status.
As the legislative history of the DOMA suggests, there has never
before been a congressional statute which purported to define "mar-
riage." In light of the findings of the House Judiciary Committee in
the 52nd Congress that it did not have constitutional authority to en-
act uniform marriage and divorce laws, 65 the DOMA appears to test
the limits of Congress' constitutional authority without the constitu-
tional amendment Congress has been unable to pass.'
66
In determining the constitutionality of Section 3 of the DOMA it
is important to remember that if Congress has the power to proscribe
homosexual marriages, it also has the power to disfavor Louisiana's
"covenant marriage" or people who are married after being divorced,
widowed or widowered. Similarly, Congress might exclude marriages
where a U.S. citizen married a resident alien from a country which
was currently disfavored by the United States, or where one of the
spouses has been convicted of a crime, or has obtained or assisted in
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Ridgeway v. Ridgeway, 454 U.S. 46 (1981) (federal servicemen's group life insur-
ance benefits); McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981) (military retirement benefits);
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979) (federal railroad retirement benefits).
165. See supra text accompanying notes 130-33.
166. One commentator has suggested that the DOMA's proscription of same-sex mar-
riages should be tested under the rule which requires that before a state law governing
domestic relations will be deemed overridden by the Supremacy Clause it must be found to
do "major damage" to "clear and substantial federal interests." Ruskay-Kidd, supra note
134, at 1478-79. However, this test only comes into play if it is unclear whether Congress
has "positively required [a departure from state law] by direct enactment .... ." Rose v.
Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 625 (1987) (citations omitted). It is hard to see how Congress could
have been clearer in its directive to depart from inconsistent state law than the language of
Section 3 of the DOMA.
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obtaining an abortion. Thus, the potential impact of a congressional
power to define "marriage" reaches far beyond the question of homo-
sexual marriage.
How will the DOMA's definitions of "marriage" and "spouse"
affect the states' ability to exercise their reserved power over domestic
relations? The available evidence suggests that if a state decides to
use a definition of "marriage" or "spouse" different from those
adopted by Congress, the pervasive nature of federal regulation will
make it practically impossible for a state to operate with those differ-
ent definitions, and Section 3 of the DOMA will have the effect of
coercing states into using the federal definitions, for fear of losing the
federal money and other benefits to which those definitions are
attached.
One commentator has concluded that in such circumstances "the
States confront a system of federalism more coopting than coopera-
tive, in which the basic values of pluralism, creativity, participation
and liberty are progressively undermined."' 67 Thus, "[m]aintaining
clear lines of political accountability at the federal and state levels has
emerged as a primary way of ensuring the integrity of the Constitu-
tion's structural design.' 168
A. The ACIR Reports
The United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations ("ACIR") was a nonpartisan group created by Congress in
1959 to monitor the operation our federal system, and to recommend
improvements. It was composed of twenty-six members: nine repre-
senting Congress and the Executive Branch, four state governors,
three state legislators, four mayors, three elected county officials, and
three private citizens. 69 Since its establishment, ACIR has published
numerous reports and findings on the status of intergovernmental re-
lations. These reports have been frequently cited by the Supreme
Court.'70
167. Kaden, supra note 151, at 868.
168. Note, Federalism, Political Accountability and the Spending Clause, 107 HARv. L.
REv. 1419, 1422 (1994).
169. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4271-4273. Congress disbanded ACIR in late 1996. Pub. L. 104-
328, § 1(a).
170. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 n. 12, 553
n.14 (1985); id. at 565 n.9 (Powell J., dissenting); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788
n.19 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 645 (1969)
(Warren, C.J., dissenting); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 573 n.52; see id. at 583 n.65; but
see id. at 610 n.69 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
448 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 26:419
In February 1984 ACIR issued a Report entitled Regulatory Fed-
eralism: Policy, Process, Impact and Reform, in which it detailed "the
emergence of a host of federal regulatory programs aimed at or imple-
mented by state and local governments."' 71 This ACIR Report notes
several examples of federal programs that compel states to participate
on terms dictated by Congress. The unemployment insurance compo-
nent of the Social Security Act is one such example. The 1984 Report,
commenting on Steward Machine Company v. Davis,72 a Supreme
Court case that upheld the Act as a mere "temptation" from which
states were free to refrain, 73 states:
Of course, legality and philosophy aside, no state could practi-
cally have refused to participate since its business employers
would not have received the [unemployment tax] credit. The
tax-credit was thus an expedient way of avoiding Constitutional
objections to a direct compulsion of state action under the com-
merce power.' 74
In making its recommendations, the 1984 ACIR Report "urges recon-
sideration.., of current interpretations of the commerce and spend-
ing powers as they apply to the newer and more intrusive form of
federal regulation. ... ,175 Moreover,
[G]iven the substantial fiscal reliance of state and local govern-
ments upon federal financial aid and the often intrusive nature
of regulations attached to modem federal grants, the Commis-
sion expresses its further hope that the federal judiciary, whenjudging grantor-grantee disputes, will recognize that "compul-
sion" rather than "voluntariness" and "coercion" rather than
"inducement" now characterize many federal grants-in-aid and
their requirements. 76
The 1984 ACIR Report also characterizes the congressional man-
dates to the states as "back-door commandeering," and finds that it
borders on "mandating," rather than "disallowing," state activity. 177
171. U.S. ADVISORY CO~MM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REGULATORY
FEDERALISM: POLICY, PROCESS, IMPACr AND REFORM ii (1984) (hereinafter 1984 ACIR
Report).
172. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
173. Id. at 589-90; 1984 ACIR Report, supra note 171, at 31.
174. Id. (citing Kaden, supra note 151, at 884). One state supreme court has held that
the federal unemployment insurance scheme is, in fact, a "federal mandate." City of Sacra-
mento v. State, 50 Cal. 3d 51, 74 (1990) In complying, the state "simply did what was
necessary to avoid certain and severe federal penalties upon its resident businesses. Id.
The alternatives were so far beyond the realm of practical realities that they left the state
'without discretion' to depart from the federal standards." Id.
175. 1984 ACIR Report, supra note 171, at 269.
176. Id. at 270.
177. Id. at 271.
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Finally, the 1984 ACIR Report recommends that the courts partici-
pate in restoring constitutional balance to intergovernmental rela-
tions,'178 and refrain from treating "back-door-commandeering" as
congressional "commerce-power-as-usual."'1 79
The "coercive" effect of federal regulation chronicled in the 1984
ACIR Report is strikingly similar to the "commandeering" of state
officials which the Supreme Court held violates the Tenth Amend-
ment in New York v. United States.' As the Court noted in New
York: "the Constitution protects us from our own best intentions: It
divides power among sovereigns and among branches of government
precisely so that we may resist the temptation to concentrate power in
one location as an expedient solution to the crisis of the day."''
In September 1992 ACIR issued another report entitled Federal
Statutory Preemption of State and Local Authority82 in which it traced
the exercise of Congress' power to actually preempt state law under
the Supremacy Clause. 183 The ACIR noted that "[t]he supremacy
clause does not mean that the federal government is supreme in all
things; it means only that federal law is supreme within the realms of
power delegated to it by the people of the states through the U.S.
Constitution,"'1 4 and that
[o]ver the years, as congressional powers (e.g. the commerce
clause) have been interpreted more broadly, the scope of fed-
eral preemption of state and local authority has broadened as
well because conflicting state law or administrative policy must
yield to federal law enacted pursuant to the delegated powers of
the Congress. 85
That Report goes on to list 439 federal statutes that, in whole or in
part, preempt state authority.'86 It further notes the "general
rulemaking by federal agencies, which, in turn, have adopted regula-
tions that preempt state and local government authority as
well .... 1187 Finally, the 1992 ACIR Report notes that federal pre-
178. See id. at 269.
179. Im at 271.
180. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
181. Id at 187.
182. U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FEDERAL STATU-
TORY PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL AuTHoRrry: HISTORY, INVENTORY, AND Is-
suEs (1992) (hereinafter 1992 ACIR Report).
183. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
184. 1992 ACIR Report, supra note 182, at 5 (citing TiE FEDERAUST No. 33 (Alexan-
der Hamilton)).
185. Id.
186. See id. at Appendix A.
187. Id. at 14.
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emption increased from 1978 to 1991, "rivaling grants-in-aid as the
most significant facet of intergovernmental relations," and that "the
forces that seem to be encouraging preemption point to a continued
expansion of federal preemption for the foreseeable future.'188
The 1992 ACIR Report recites several reasons for the increased
federal preemption, including "the loosening of constitutional re-
straints on the exercise of congressional powers,"'8 9 Congress' obliga-
tion to enforce individual Constitutional rights uniformly, and "the
reduced fiscal capability of the federal government, [which require it
to turn] more to regulatory powers to accomplish policy
objectives.- 190
The 1992 ACIR Report also notes that both liberals and conserv-
atives find federal preemption "to be a useful tool,"'' and that "the
sheer scope of federal preemption ... suggests an increasingly coer-
cive system of intergovernmental relations."'1 92 Ultimately,
[T]he unprecedented increase in federal statutory preemption of
state and local powers since the late 1960s raises questions about
the adequacy of our understanding and appreciation of the con-
stitutional balance of power in the federal system, particularly in
light of the supremacy clause. The supremacy clause does not
make the federal government "supreme" in all matters of public
policy, nor does it make the U.S. government dominant in our
federal system. The clause simply means that the limited powers
delegated to the U.S. government by the people may be exer-
cised by the federal government without interference from or
dependence upon the states. The point is to make sure that the
U.S. government is not swallowed up by the states.
The supremacy clause, therefore, is a balance-of-power provi-
sion in the Constitution, not a provision that makes the federal
government supreme or sovereign. The supremacy clause must
be read in light of other provisions of the Constitution, espe-
cially the republican guarantee clause and the TenthAmendment.' 9
In 1993 ACIR issued a follow-up Report to its 1984 Report on
Regulatory Federalism. Entitled Federal Regulation of State and Lo-
cal Governments: The Mixed Record of the 1980s, this document ex-
amined whether the federal government's "coercive techniques to
188. Id. at 37.
189. Id.
190. IL
191. Id. at 38.
192. Id. at 40.
193. Id. at 41.
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regulate state and local governments" enacted during the 1960s and
1970s had abated with the election of President Ronald Reagan. 194
The 1993 ACIR Report found that, although there was some relief for
state and local governments in the early 1980s, "by 1990, substantial
measurable growth in burdens on state and local governments had
occurred."'1 9
5
The 1993 ACIR Report found that between 1981 and 1990, Con-
gress had enacted 27 new statutes imposing new regulatory burdens
on state and local governments or significantly expanding the burdens
from existing programs.'9 6 That Report also found that, as a practical
matter, conditions attached by Congress to its grant programs to states
became federal mandates, because no state can opt out of a multi-
billion dollar program like Medicaid because it objected to expanded
federal requirements. 197 These federal programs "generally impose
greater costs on [the states] than on the federal government, [and]
represent, in federal budgetary terms, a relatively low-cost method of
responding to issues and problems."' 98 The 1993 ACIR Report cites a
Johnson Administration Official's observation as pertinent today:
Congressmen see themselves as having been elected to legislate.
Confronted with a problem... their strong tendency is to pass a
law. Ten years ago, money was Washington's antidote for
problems. Now, the new fiscal realities.., mean that Congress
provides fewer dollars. Still determined to legislate against
problems, Congress uses sticks instead of carrots. 199
Thus, the "back door commandeering" noted in the 1984 ACIR
Report continued throughout the 1980s, and the coercive and preemp-
tive effect of federal regulation on the states continues to grow. Con-
gress' obvious political preference for a federal solution to perceived
problems, together with interest groups' understandable economic in-
terest in national, rather than state by state, answers to their constitu-
ents' demands explains why federal regulatory mandates have become
so pervasive. The cumulative effect of these federal mandates has
been to strip state governments of the right to exercise those "numer-
194. U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INvrERGOVERNMENT RELATIONS, FEDERAL REGULA-
TION OF STATE AND LoCAL GovEaRNmIrrs: Ti MxED REcoRD OF rH 1980s 1 (1993)
(hereinafter 1993 ACIR Report).
195. 1d.
196. See id. at 2.
197. See id. at 48.
198. Id. at 54.
199. Id. (citing SAMUEL HALPERIN, FEDERAL TAKEOVER, STATE DEFAULT OR FAMILY
PROBLEMS, IN FEDERALISM AT THE CROSSROADS: IMPROVING EDUCATIONAL POLICYMAK-
iN;G 19 (1976)).
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ous and indefinite" powers reserved to the states by the
Constitution.2°
With Section 2 of the DOMA, Congress grants states the right to
avoid ratifying a sister state's same-sex marriage, but then in Section 3
takes away that state's ability to define "marriage" and "spouse" for
itself. Rather than restoring balance to the relationship between the
states and the federal government, Section 3 of the DOMA invades an
"area of primary state responsibility" which the Constitution reserves
to the states. The following examples of particular federal regulations
further illustrate the scope of the DOMA's affect on the states.
B. The Internal Revenue Code
One of the most pervasive federal regulatory schemes is the In-
ternal Revenue Code. Until the DOMA was enacted, "[C]ongress
had given nearly exclusive control over access to the tax benefits of
marriage to the states, through their regulation of marriage."201 The
benefits granted "married" persons under the Internal Revenue Code
are so attractive that, notwithstanding the so-called "marriage pen-
alty,"202 "most taxpayers would readily fie jointly in order to receive
these benefits. °203 Since state taxing schemes must not be in conflict
with the Internal Revenue Code,2 0 4 the DOMA provides a strong in-
centive for states to define "marriage" and "spouse" in accord with
Congress' definition. For instance, many states impose income, gift
and estate taxes in addition to those imposed by the Internal Revenue
Code.20 5 The 40 states with personal income taxes use the taxpayer's
federal adjusted gross income as the "computational starting point"
for determining state taxable income.20 6 That computation uses the
Internal Revenue Code's determination of marital status.20 7 Since
200. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 7, at 236.
201. Christopher J. Hayes, Note, Married Filing Jointly: Federal Recognition of Same-
Sex Marriages Under the Internal Revenue Code, 47 HASTINGS LJ. 1593, 1602 (1996) (con-
cluding that the DOMA is an unconstitutional violation of the Equal Protection Clause
and exceeds Congress' power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
202. Id. at 1599 n.18. The "marriage penalty" results when both spouses in a marriage
work, resulting in a higher tax bracket for a joint return than would have been realized if
each spouse filed individually. See also Hasday, supra note 101, at 1376 n.306.
203. Hayes, supra note 201, at 1602.
204. See U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2.
205. See generally J. HELLERSTEiN & W. HELLERSTEN, STATE TAXATION [ 20 & 21
(1992).
206. Id. at 20.02.
207. See generally M. RosE & J. CHomME, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 778-89 (3d ed.
1988). By deciding to file as a married couple, the spouses combine their incomes for the
purpose of determining adjusted gross income. If a "marriage" is not recognized by the
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Congress has never before defined "marriage" or "spouse," and no
state has yet adopted definitions of those terms which are contrary to
the DOMA, no conflict presently exists. But, if Hawaii, or some other
state decides to issue marriage licenses to homosexual couples, or sup-
pose Congress later decides to exclude "covenant marriages," and/or
previously widowed/widowered, divorced or criminally convicted peo-
ple from its definitions of "marriage" and "spouse," the DOMA's im-
pact will be significant.
Indeed, as a practical matter, states must coordinate their taxing
laws with the Internal Revenue Service. Thus, the cost and adminis-
trative difficulty of a state taxing scheme which defines marriage dif-
ferently from the Internal Revenue Code would be prohibitive. As
the 1984 ACIR Report states: "legality and philosophy aside, no state
could practically [define "marriage" and "spouse" differently than the
DOMA]. , ,208
C. Federally Funded Programs
Benefits under the Federal Social Security System will also be im-
pacted by DOMA.2 ° 9 Since state "entitlement" programs which re-
ceive money from Congress-unemployment insurance for instance-
are subject to federal regulation,210 the DOMA's definitions of "mar-
riage" and "spouse" will control. For instance, in deciding which
wages are subject to unemployment insurance tax, states must not in-
clude any payment by an employer "which may be excluded from the
gross income of an employee, [or] his spouse .... ,211 "Employment"
is defined to include: "services performed by an individual in the em-
ploy of his son, daughter or spouse. ' 212
These basic definitions governing unemployment insurance incor-
porate Congress' definitions of "marriage" and "spouse," and demon-
Internal Revenue Code, the taxpayers would not have the option of combining their in-
comes to determine the taxable adjusted gross income.
208. 1984 ACIR Report, supra note 171, at 208.
209. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 402 (b), (c), (e) & (f) (1998) (granting old age and death
benefits to non-working spouses and children); 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-1 (1998) (same regarding
death benefits). See Ruskay-Kidd, supra note 134, at 1467-69; Hasday, supra note 101, at
1382-85 (showing how the Social Security System distributes benefits based upon marital
status).
210. See Federal-State Unemployment Compensation System, Committee on Ways and
Means, U.S. House of Representatives, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 18-19 (U.S. Gov't Printing
Office 1988) [hereinafter Unemployment Compensation] (concluding that Federal Social
Security System controls revenue sources and benefits for state unemployment compensa-
tion programs).
211. 26 U.S.C. § 3306(b)(12) (1994) (emphasis added).
212. Id. § 3306(c)(5).
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strate that trying to operate with different state definitions would be
practically impossible if a state wants its people to participate in the
broad range of federal funding and other benefits available. Since
federal law provides a broad framework to which each state program
must conform in areas where uniformity is considered essential,2
1 3
state/federal programs based on "cooperative federalism," with the
federal government providing the money in exchange for the states'
compliance with federal regulation,214 will also serve to compel states
to adopt the federal definitions of "marriage" and "spouse" as a con-
dition of participation.
Effective July 1, 1997, Congress repealed the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children program ("AFDC"), except as to state(s) that
"opt out[,]" and replaced it with a program of Block Grants to states
for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families ("Block Grant Pro-
gram"). 215 Among the stated purposes of the Block Grant Program is
"to end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by
promoting... marriage[;] ' '21 6 "to prevent and reduce the incidence of
out-of-wedlock pregnancies[;] ' ' 21 7 and to "encourage the formation
and maintenance of two-parent families."21 Under the "cooperative
federalism" AFDC program, families with children are automatically
eligible for some aid, but under the Block Grant Program, in order to
receive any money a state must first submit a plan which indicates,
among other things, how the state intends to "establish goals and take
action to prevent and reduce the incidents of out-of-wedlock
pregnancies. 2 1 9
The Block Grant Program also provides a "bonus" of between
$20,000,000 and $25,000,000 to states which demonstrate a net de-
crease in out-of-wedlock births.22 Thus, Congress has overtly stated
that it is using Block Grants to promote its definition of "marriage,"
and has offered a substantial reward to those states that conform.
Given Congress' stated purposes for the Block Grant Program, it is
213. See Unemployment Compensation, supra note 210, at 12.
214. See James C. Fontana, State Regulations Implementing Federal AFDC Provisions
Are Constitutional Despite Conclusive Presumptions Concerning an Applicant's Income
Availability, 56 TEMP. L.Q. 773, 774 n.3 (1983).
215. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-679 (1998). See also Hasday, supra note 101, at 1381-82 (citing
AFDC as an example of benefits based on marital status).
216. Id. § 601(a)(2).
217. Id. § 601(a)(3).
218. Id. § 601(a)(4).
219. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)(A)(v).
220. See id. § 603(a)(2).
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doubtful a state would qualify if it used a definition of "marriage"
different from that of Congress.221
D. Labor Law and Other Examples
"Congress has broad constitutional authority to preempt state au-
thority over all aspects of the employment relationship."'222 In the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"),2 3 which cov-
ers virtually all employee benefit plans, Congress has expressly pre-
empted state law.' 4  Thus, DOMA's Section 3 definition of
"marriage" and "spouse" control in virtually all employee benefit
plans. As pointed out in a recent commentary on the DOMA: "[flaws
that treat married persons in a different manner than they treat single
persons permeate nearly every field of social regulation in this
country."'
DOMA also changes the definition of "marriage" and "spouse"
in numerous other areas of federal law that affect states;226 including
bankruptcy,2 7 consumer credit,228 education,229 health,2 0 housing,23
221. A lesbian couple whose child was conceived by artificial insemination would be
considered an "out-of-wedlock" birth under the DOMA's definition of "marriage," even if
the couple was deemed married under State law. The same would be true for a gay male
couple who arranged for a surrogate mother to bear their child. If Congress amended its
definitions of "marriage" and "spouse" to exclude other people, such as those in a "cove-
nant marriage" or those who have been divorced, widowed, widowered, convicted of a
crime or participated in an abortion, children of those unions would also be deemed to be
"out-of-wedlock."
222. Henry Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign States: Preemption and the Second Twen-
tieth Century Revolution In the Law of the American Workplace, 62 FoRDHA L. REv. 469,
536 (1993).
223. 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (1994). See also Hasday, supra note 101, at 1384 n.344 (noting
that ERISA regulates retirement plans worth trillions of dollars).
224. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
225. Ruskay-Kidd, supra note 134, at 1468 (quoting David L. Chambers, What If? The
Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95
MIcH. L. REv. 447 (1996)); Joseph W. Hovermill, A Conflict of Laws and Morals: The
Choice of Law Implications of Hawaii's Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 53 MD. L.
REv. 450, 451 (1994) (noting that a legally recognized marriage confers "income tax advan-
tages, health care benefits and the right to make health-care decisions for an incapacitated
spouse"); Robert L. Cordell, Same-Sex Marriage: The Fundamental Right of Marriage and
An Examination of Conflict of Laws and the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 26 COLuM. Hum.
RTs. L. REv. 247,255-57 (1994) (noting that a legal marriage confers tax advantages, inher-
itance rights, health benefits, and the right to enter into pre-marital agreements).
226. See Ruskay-Kidd, supra note 134, at 1467-68.
227. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7) (1994). See Tisha Morris Federico, Note, The Im-
pact of the Defense of Marriage Act on Section 302 of the Bankruptcy Code and the Result-
ing Renewed Interest in the Equitable Doctrine of Substantial Consolidation, 103 COM. L.J.
82, 90 (1998).
228. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(2)(A) (1994).
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the military,2 = veterans benefits,2 3 and welfare.2 4 It is further signif-
icant to consider the difficulty in handling state court lawsuits which
are removed to federal court. As state substantive and federal proce-
dure law would apply, a couple could be considered "married" for
rulings on substantive matters going to the merits of the case, but un-
married for procedural matters, such as the spousal testimonial privi-
leges . 35 The obvious chaos resulting from different state and federal
definitions of "marriage" and "spouse" would ultimately force the
state to either challenge Congress' power to enact different federal
definitions, or adopt those definitions as its own. The Supremacy
Clause leaves a state no other realistic choice. Thus, the "narrow Fed-
eral requirement" referred to in DOMA's legislative history is, in fact,
a huge shift to federal control over state domestic relations law.3 6
The power exercised by Congress in Section 3 of the DOMA is a
significant escalation of the tension between Congress and the states
as independent sovereigns; 7 and it flies in the face of the Supreme
Court's statement that "[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations,
belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United
States." 8 The House Judiciary Committee acknowledged that Con-
gress is taking sides in a "culture war" 9 by purporting to protect
under Section 2 of the DOMA a state's "right" define "marriage,"
and then take away any real ability to exercise that "right" by defining
"marriage" and "spouse" in Section 3. Although Section 3 does not
directly "commandeer" state officials into federal service, 24 ° it is the
229. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1087nn(b)(1)(A) (1998).
230. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(c)(3)(B) (1998).
231. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 3712(a)(4)(A)(vi)(III) & (a)(4)(C) (1998).
232. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 1784 (1998); 37 U.S.C. § 427 (1998).
233. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. §§ 3501(a)(1)(B), (C), and (D) & 3511 (1998).
234. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1382b (1998).
235. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards 504 U.S. 689 (1992). Rule 501 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence provides that the State law of privilege applies as a general rule. The Histori-
cal Notes to that section state that Congress believed that State law should apply to privi-
leges, "absent a compelling reason" to apply federal law. FED. R. EviD. 501. DOMA
appears to supply that compelling reason.
236. See Kaden, supra note 151, at 876.
237. Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism's Trojan
Horse, 1988 Sup. Cr. REv. 85, 89-90 (1988) ("It was inevitable from the start that dual
sovereignty, despite its advantages, would give rise to tensions over the respective spheres
of state or national governance .... In such an environment, pressures for national control
increase, and it is all too easy to forget the values that flow from local governance.").
238. Ex Parte Burrus, 136 U.S. at 593-94.
239. The Committee refers to Justice Scalia's dissent in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
240. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992).
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"back-door commandeering" condemned in the 1984 ACIR Report
by coercing, "or otherwise motivating," states to regulate in an area at
the "core of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment."241
Since Congress itself has determined that it cannot directly define
"marriage" or "spouse" for the states, its not-so-subtle attempt to ac-
complish that end with Section 3 of the DOMA and the over 3,900
federal statutes and regulations affected242 should not be mistaken for
anything other than the invasion of an area of law reserved to the
states. As the dissenting minority of the House Judiciary Committee
stated:
If Hawaii or any other state were to allow people of the same
sex who were deeply and emotionally attached to each other to
regularize that relationship in a marriage, this bill says that the
federal government would refuse to recognize it. Note that this
is the case whether such decision is made by a State Supreme
Court, a referendum of the state's population, a vote of the
state's legislature, or some combination thereof. Thus, the bill is
exactly the opposite of a states rights measure: The only real
force it will have will be to deny a state and the people of that
state the right to make decisions on the question of same sex
marriage.
Although Section 2 of the DOMA may be struck down on other
constitutional grounds, the basis for striking down Section 3 may be
found in Justice O'Connor's majority opinion for the Court in New
York v. United States.2" According to that decision, Congress did not
present a case where it was "encourag[ing] state regulation rather
than compelling it," and where "state governments remain responsive
to the local electorate's preferences; state officials remain accountable
to the people. '2 45 Rather, the federal government was compelling the
State of New York to regulate. This was unacceptable because "it
may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval,
while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may
remain insulated from the electorial ramifications of their
decision. "246
In Section 3 of the DOMA, Congress is not actually directing the
states how to define "marriage" and "spouse." Rather, it is using its
241. d at 177. See also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,564-65 (1995); see also id.
at 585 (Thomas, J., concurring); but see id. at 624 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
242. See House Report, supra note 136, at 10.
243. Id. at 42.
244. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
245. Id. at 168.
246. Id. at 169.
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coercive regulatory and economic power in the more than 3,900 fed-
eral regulations where the new definitions are effective to compel
compliance with its definitions.247 Though states can theoretically re-
fuse to follow the federal lead, no state can practically "opt-out" of all
federally funded and regulated programs.248 Thus, this "back-door
commandeering" is like the coercive congressional regulation con-
demned in New York and Printz. Rather than a "narrow Federal re-
quirement," the effect of Section 3 of the DOMA is to "infring[e]
upon the core of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amend-
ment,"24 9 by coercing the states into defining "marriage" and
"spouse" Congress' way. 50
VI. Federalism and the Sixteenth and
Seventeenth Amendments
Why does Congress now believe it can regulate marriage? Since
the Tenth Amendment was ratified, and Congress determined it
would have to amend the Constitution to enact marriage and divorce
laws, two amendments to the Constitution have altered the balance of
economic power between the states and the federal government, and
eliminated state governments' direct participation in Congress. The
following brief review of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amendments
and two recent U.S. Supreme Court cases highlights the continuing
limits on Congress' power, and underscores the unconstitutionality of
DOMA.
In 1913, the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution was
adopted. It established the "unapportioned" federal income tax as we
know it today, "effectively [giving] the national government unlimited
control of the nation's wealth and, consequently, a virtually unlimited
spending power."'" "By extracting money from the now-defenseless
states and offering to return it with strings attached, the national gov-
ernment is able to control by promises of reward-some would say
247. See House Report, supra note 136, at 10.
248. See supra text accompanying note 197-200. See also Todd J. Zywicki, Beyond the
Shell and Husk of History: The History of Seventeenth Amendment and Its Implications For
Current Reform Proposals, 45 CLEv. ST. L. Rnv. 165,224 (1997) ("the underlying problem
[is] the intrusiveness and unlimited power of the federal government to redistribute wealth
to favored interest groups.").
249. New York, 505 U.S. at 177.
250. See id.
251. Lino A. Graglia, From Federal Union to National Monolith: Mileposts In the De-
mise of American Federalism, 16 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 119, 130-31 (1993). See also
David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 Duyrc L.J. 1, 33-34 (1994).
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bribery-whatever it might be unable or unwilling to control by threat
of punishment." 2
In United States v. Butler z 3 the Court held that the taxing and
spending scheme contained in the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act
was an unconstitutional invasion of reserved state powers. That Act
increased the price of certain farm products by decreasing the quanti-
ties produced. The decrease in quantity was accomplished by paying
farmers to let their land lay fallow for a period of time. To pay those
farmers for the fallow land a tax was levied on the processing of the
commodities derived from the farm products being regulated. 54 The
Court held the tax was a "mere incident" to a program designed to
regulate agricultural production,25: which was beyond Congress' enu-
merated powers. The Court found that the federal government did
not try to sustain the Act under the Commerce Clause, 6 but also said
that Congress' power to tax and spend "is not limited by direct grants
of legislative power found in the Constitution."'257
Even granting Congress a taxing and spending power broader
than its enumerated powers, the Court found the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act to be an unconstitutional invasion of reserved state powers,
holding that the
power of taxation, which is expressly granted, may, of course, be
adopted as a means to carry into operation another power also
expressly granted. But resort to the taxing power to effectuate
an end which is not legitimate, not within the scope of the Con-
stitution, is obviously inadmissible. Congress is not empowered
to tax for those purposes which are within the exclusive prov-
ince of the States?58
The Court cited Butler in South Dakota v. Dole,2 9 where the Court
upheld Congress' requirement that states raise their minimum drink-
ing age to 21 in order to receive federal highway funds. The Court
rejected the State's contention that the Twenty-First Amendment to
the Constitution grants "virtually complete control" over the regula-
252. Ld. (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (holding that Congressional
withholding of highway funds to encourage establishment of a minimum drinking age is a
valid use of the spending power)).
253. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
254. See id. at 54-55.
255. Md at 61.
256. See id at 64.
257. Id at 66.
258. Id at 69.
259. 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987) (citing United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)).
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tion of liquor distribution to states,260 and held that a "Tenth Amend-
ment limitation on congressional regulation of state affairs [does] not
concomitantly limit the range of conditions legitimately placed on fed-
eral grants." '261 The Court concluded that:
[Our precedent] establishes that the 'independent constitutional
bar' limitation on the spending power is not, as petitioner sug-
gests, a prohibition on the indirect achievement of objectives
which Congress is not empowered to achieve directly. Instead,
we think that the language in our earlier opinions stands for the
unexceptional proposition that the power may not be used to
induce the States to engage in activities that would themselves
be unconstitutional.262
The Chief Justice, however, proceeded to note, "our decisions have
recognized that in some circumstances the financial inducement of-
fered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which
'pressure turns into compulsion.'" 263
In determining that Congress' condition on highway spending
was not unconstitutional, the Chief Justice emphasized that if South
Dakota chose to set its minimum drinking age below 21, it would lose
only five percent of the federal funds otherwise obtainable.204 Rather
than "compulsion," the Dole majority characterized the congressional
condition on federal highway funds as "mild encouragement" to the
states.2
65
In her Dole dissent, Justice O'Connor disagreed with the major-
ity's reading of Butler, and found that the regulation was outside of
Congress' power because it falls "within the ambit of ... the Twenty-
first Amendment. 26 6 She noted that:
If the spending power is to be limited only by Congress' notion
of the general welfare, the reality, given the vast financial re-
sources of the Federal Government, is that the Spending Clause
gives 'power to the Congress to tear down the barriers, to in-
vade the states' jurisdiction, and to become a parliament of the
whole people, subject to no restrictions save such as are self-
imposed.' 2 7
260. Id. at 205 (citing California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
445 U.S. 97 (1980)).
261. Id. at 210.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 211 (citing Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1947)).
264. See id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 212 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 217 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78
(1936)).
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Justice O'Connor concluded that "Congress has no power under the
Spending Clause to impose requirements on a grant that go beyond
specifying how the money should be spent,"' 68 stressing that, "[t]he
immense size and power of the Government of the United States
ought not obscure its fundamental character. It remains a Govern-
ment of enumerated powers." 69
In New York v. United States, 70 Justice O'Connor once again ad-
dressed Congress' power to condition federal spending in upholding
the financial incentives offered to states which developed sites to re-
ceive radioactive waste from other states.27 She noted that the state
did not have to participate in the financial incentives, and did not con-
tend that Congress had exceeded its spending power as enunciated in
Dole, but contended that the form of the expenditure was constitu-
tionally objectionable. 72 New York claimed that the money actually
spent by Congress had been collected from the state in the first place,
and was, therefore, not actually "federal funds" to which federal con-
ditions might properly attach. 3 Justice O'Connor found that the
Spending Clause "has never been construed to deprive Congress of
the power to structure federal spending in this manner,"'274 concluding
"that the States are able to choose whether they will receive federal
funds does not make the resulting expenditures any less federal; in-
deed, the location of such a choice in the States is an inherent element
in any conditional exercise of Congress' spending power."'275
In Section 3 of the DOMA, Congress has attached a significant
condition to all federal spending: that "marriage" and "spouse" be de-
fined Congress' way. States are compelled to accept these definitions
if they want federal money in much the same way that they are com-
pelled to set their drinking age at 21 if they want federal highway
funds, but all applicable federal funds are tied to this condition rather
than the five percent at issue in Dole. Although Section 3 of the
268. Id. at 216 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
269. Id. at 218 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheaton) 316, 405 (1819)). Justice Brennan, a staunch supporter of the Court's opinion in
Garcia, also dissented in Dole, agreeing with Justice O'Connor that Congress cannot condi-
tion federal spending in a manner that abridges a constitutional power which is reserved to
the states. See id. at 212 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Lynn A. Baker, Conditional
Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 CoLrM. L. Rnv. 1911, 1989 (1995).
270. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
271. See id. at 188.
272. See id. at 172.
273. See id.
274. Id. at 173.
275. Id.
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DOMA does not directly mandate that each state legislature define
"marriage" and "spouse" Congress' way, unlike the financial incen-
tives in New York, its practical effect is to give states no realistic
choice but to accede to Congress' definitions for state law. The finan-
cial inducement offered by Congress is "so coercive as to pass the
point at which 'pressure turns to compulsion.' "276 In addition, the
DOMA's definitions attached to the federal purse strings invade the
states' jurisdiction in an area which is clearly outside the "enumerated
power" of Congress.
Justice Brennan's brief dissent in Dole may provide a key to how
the Court will address Section 3 of DOMA. In Dole, he agreed with
Justice O'Connor that the Twenty-First Amendment reserved to the
states the power to set the drinking age, notwithstanding the interstate
relationship between the State's drinking age and federal highway
funds.277 Thus, Justice Brennan argued that in an area of power which
is clearly reserved to the states by the Constitution, "Congress cannot
condition a federal grant in a manner that abridges this right. '2 78
Since all of the current Justices on the Court apparently agree that
regulating domestic relations is reserved to the states,279 even those
who agree with Justice Brennan's views on Congress' power to regu-
late the states generally may also agree that in the area of domestic
relations Congress may not condition the receipt of federal funds on a
state's acquiescence in federal definitions of "marriage" and
"spouse.' '2s° Thus, Congress' power to attach conditions to its spend-
ing should not overcome a Tenth Amendment challenge to Section 3
of the DOMA.
In 1913, the states also ratified the Seventeenth Amendment, re-
moving their legislatures' power to appoint United States Senators
and giving it to the people."8 It has been said that the Seventeenth
Amendment, "eliminat[ed] the primary device relied on by the Fram-
ers to protect the constitutionally reserved zone of state sovereignty,
276. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (citing Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1947)).
277. See id. at 212 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
278. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally Kristian D. Whitten, Conditional Fed-
eral Spending and the States "Free Exercise" of the Tenth Amendment, 21 CAMPBELL L.
Rnv. 5, 20-21 (1998).
279. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564-65 (1995); id. at 585 (Thomas, J.,
concurring); but see id. at 624 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
280. See David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 Duyc L.J. 1, 61 n.252 (1994) (as-
serting that Justice Brennan's Dole dissent aligns him with the majority in Butler).
281. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII; see also Graglia, supra note 251, at 131.
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[and] rendered dubious the presumption that state sovereignty would
be properly respected in every federal statute or regulation. ' 282
In his opinion for the Court in Garcia, Justice Blackmun noted
that the Seventeenth Amendment "alter[ed] the influence of the
States in the Federal political process[,]" 3 but nevertheless found
"that the fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme im-
poses on the Commerce Clause to protect the states as states' is one of
process rather than one of result." 4 In his Garcia dissent, Justice
Powell wrote that, prior to the Seventeenth Amendment,
the view that the structure of the Federal Government sufficed
to protect the States might have had a somewhat more practical,
although not a more logical, basis, [however,] ... [t]he adoption
of the Seventeenth Amendment (providing for direct election of
Senators), the weakening of political parties on the local level,
and the rise of national media, among other things, have made
Congress increasingly less representative of state and local inter-
ests, and more likely to be responsive to the demands of various
national constituencies. 85
In her Garcia dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor also refers to
the Seventeenth Amendment stating that: "[tihese changes may well
have lessened the weight Congress gives to the legitimate interests of
States as States." 6 Thus, as a result of their ratifying these two
Amendments as a practical matter the states have ceded substantial
economic and political power to the Congress. The Sixteenth Amend-
ment greatly enlarged Congress' power to assert its supremacy in ex-
tracting tax revenue from the states' people, returning that money to
the states with conditions it could not otherwise constitutionally im-
pose, and the Seventeenth Amendment removed state legislative su-
pervision of United States Senators.287 But, there is nothing in the
282. Roger G. Brooks, Comment, Garcia, The Seventeenth Amendment, And The Role
of The Supreme Court In Defending Federalism, 10 HAgv J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 189, 208
(1987); see also Zywicki, supra note 248; Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct
Election: A Structural Examination of the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L. REv.
1347, 1379-80 (1996); THE FEDERALIST, No. 26, at 129-30 (Alexander Hamilton) (Bantam
Classics ed., 1982) ("[T]he state Legislatures... will always be ... suspicious and jealous
guardians of the rights of the citizens, against encroachments from the federal
government[.]").
283. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985).
284. Id.
285. Id. at 565 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing 1984 ACIR Report, supra note 171).
286. Id. at 584 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
287. See Zywicki, supra note 248, at 233; THE FEDERALIST, No. 62, at 313 (James
Madison) (Bantam Classics ed., 1982) ("giving to the state governments such an agency in
the formation of the federal government, as must secure the authority of the former; and
may form a convenient link between the two systems.").
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legislative history of either Amendment to suggest an intent to alter
the system of dual sovereignty contemplated by the Constitution.
And, though the political landscape has changed since 1892, when
Congress determined it would need to amend the Constitution in or-
der to enact uniform marriage and divorce laws, there is nothing to
suggest a Constitutional change eliminating the need for such an
amendment. Indeed, Congress' failure to act in this area until now
may be evidence of "the persistent view that our federal system in its
very design contemplates that the states shall possess regulatory au-
thority over the realm of family relations.""2
VII. Conclusion
As articulated by Congress, Section 3 of the DOMA does not
announce itself as a condition attached to federal spending or a direc-
tive to state executive and legislators. Rather, it is disguised as a "nar-
row Federal requirement" denying federal marital benefits to same-
sex couples, not unlike federal statutes which allocate those benefits
to spouses of armed forces personnel and railroad retirees. However,
DOMA's restriction applies to all federal statutes and regulations, not
just federal employees' benefits, and it actually defines who is and is
not married for purposes of federal law. Until now, federal law has
accepted the states' determination of marital status, even though dif-
ferent state laws led to inconsistent federal benefit determinations. 289
That it is, in fact, a condition attached to all federal spending, and
a not-so-subtle directive to state executives and legislators becomes
clear by examining whether it is possible for a state to function if it
chooses not to adopt Congress' definitions of "marriage" and
"spouse." The Supremacy Clause, together with the Internal Revenue
Code, Social Security, ERISA and the myriad other federal laws and
regulations included in the 3,900 affected by DOMA, make such a
choice a practical impossibility.
With Section 3 of the DOMA, Congress has created the "compul-
sion" against which Chief Justice Rehnquist warned in South Dakota
v. Dole,.90 and imposed a motivation to regulate which is outside the
scope of Congress' enumerated powers as announced in New York v.
288. Daily, supra note 100, at 1824.
289. See United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 355-56 (1956); A. CLARK, THE LAW OF
DoMEsnc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 253-54 (1987).
290. 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (citing Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590
(1947)).
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United States.29 In the same way Congress' commerce, taxing and
spending powers have expanded, the pervasive nature of federal regu-
lation resulting from that expansion has caused an inevitable intrusion
into areas of state sovereignty to the point that Congress is now regu-
lating matters at the core of that state sovereignty: domestic relations.
Such federal regulation was not envisioned by the Framers; that it is
outside Congress' power is underscored by the legislative history of
the DOMA itself, which notes that a serious constitutional problem
would arise if Congress were to direct the states to define "marriage"
and "spouse" in a particular way. Since that is the practical effect of
Section 3 of the DOMA, Congress' own findings should assist a seri-
ous constitutional challenge to the federal definitions of "marriage"
and "spouse."
The Congressional majority's testimonial legal expert, Professor
Lynn Wardle, continues to assert that the DOMA does not improperly
impose Congress' definitions of "marriage" and "spouse" on the
states. To support this view he cites federal immigration laws which
do not recognize certain marriages which are valid under state laws.29
But Professor Wardle's analogy is not on point. While it is true that
federal courts of appeals have upheld such federal immigration legis-
lation, they did not address a federal law actually imposing definitions
of "marriage" and "spouse" across the board on all federal statutes
and regulations. Thus, even if the Supreme Court ultimately finds it
constitutional for Congress to deny a visa or automatic citizenship to
certain aliens who are married under state law, that is a far cry from
Congress disallowing all federal benefits to all people married under
state domestic relations laws which do not conform to the will of Con-
gress. As in De Sylva v. Ballentine,293 which dealt with copyright law,
with immigration law the Court would be interpreting federal rights,
the creation and allocation of which are expressly delegated to Con-
gress by the Constitution.294 This is the circumstance in which the
Framers intended that federal law would be supreme.295 In short,
what may be a constitutional restriction on marital benefits in a lim-
ited regulatory area expressly delegated to Congress by the Constitu-
tion, becomes unconstitutional when imposed beyond the scope of
291. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
292. See Lynn D.Wardle, DOMA: Protecting Federalism in Family Law, 45 FED. LAW
30, 33 (Feb. 1998).
293. 351 U.S. 570 (1955).
294. See U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (immigration and naturalization); U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (copyrights).
295. See U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2.
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Congress' enumerated powers and in an area of law reserved to the
states, especially where the Congressional legislation inhibits the ef-
fective and efficient operation of state law.296
Professor Wardle himself recognizes the states' interest in domes-
tic relations as "one of the clearest boundary lines of our federalism,"
in a "constitutional equilibrium between the [federal] and State gov-
ernment."2 97 What he fails to acknowledge is that by defining "mar-
riage" and "spouse" for all federal programs, Congress has upset that
constitutional equilibrium." Given Congress' recent proclivity for
"federalizing" areas of law previously left to the states, it is not at all
unreasonable to suppose that if its power to define "marriage" and
"spouse" goes unchallenged, a future congressional majority may side
with politically powerful groups like the American Civil Liberties
Union, who oppose "covenant marriage, '298 and define "marriage"
and "spouse" to exclude people in those marriages. Congress may
also determine that people who have been divorced or have partici-
pated in obtaining an abortion are not "married" under federal law.
Since the Lopez Court strongly suggests that regulation of do-
mestic relations is reserved to the states as part of a "core" of their
296. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) (finding that a federal gun
control law improperly effects "change in the sensitive relations between federal and state
criminal jurisdiction") (quoting United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411-12 (1973));
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,169 (1992) (holding that the federal nuclear waste
"take title" requirement improperly diminished the accountability of Congress "when, due
to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views of
the local electorate in manners not pre-empted by federal regulation."). See generally
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (holding that the President may not
constitutionally "cancel" a portion of a bill passed by both houses of Congress, even
though he could constitutionally veto that portion if it were sent to him as a separate bill.)
297. Wardle, supra notes 93, at 221-22. Wardle states:
Since 1789, the broad, general authority of the States to regulate family relations
in the absence of virtually any authority of the federal government to directly
regulate family relations, has been one of the clearest boundary lines of our feder-
alism. The regulation of family relations historically has been, and as a matter of
constitutional law still remains, primarily a matter of state law. Indeed, the
Supreme Court of the United States has observed, not infrequently, that the 'reg-
ulation of domestic relations [is] an area that has long been regarded as a virtually
exclusive province of the states.' Behind the practices of federalism are strong
policy values such as respect for the value and appreciation of the need to pre-
serve what Alexander Hamilton described as 'the constitutional equilibrium be-
tween the general and State governments' the desire to preserve and foster
pluralism, the belief that laws regulating families should reflect local values, re-
spect for the expertise of state courts, and the belief that the federal government
has more than enough other important problems to address.
Id & nn. 252-53.
298. Lawton, supra note 2, at 2508 (asserting that the American Civil Liberties Union
opposes "covenant marriage" as "an impermissible joinder of church and state").
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sovereignty, Congress' definitions of "marriage" and "spouse" for all
federal spending runs afoul of the Court's proscription against using
the spending power to coerce a state into complying with regulations
which do not stem from one of Congress' enumerated powers. Thus,
Congress' actions have the practical effect of mandating how state of-
ficials exercise the "numerous and indefinite" power reserved to the
states.
Although many do not support same-sex marriages, those who
value a state's right to operate under marriage laws which are in con-
formance with the will of its people should remember Justice
O'Connor's admonition that "the erosion of state sovereignty is likely
to occur a step at a time." "If there is any danger, it lies in the tyranny
of small decisions-in the prospect that Congress will nibble away at
state sovereignty, bit by bit, until someday essentially nothing is left
but a gutted shell. 29
9
As of this writing, no state has formally recognized same-sex mar-
riages,3 °° and in light of Section 3 of the DOMA none may ever do so.
A contemporary and cynical version of the "Golden Rule" may be at
work here: "Those with the gold make the rules." But if its real effect
on the states' ability to define the marriage relationship for their peo-
ple is fully considered, Section 3 of the DOMA will be seen to invade
the "core of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment." 0' 1
299. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. at 533 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting
TU E, supra note 24, at 381).
300. See Wardle supra note 292, at 32. See also Charles J. Butler, The Defense of Mar-
riage Act: Congress' Use of Narrative in the Debate Over Same-Sex Marriage, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 841, 863 n.136 (1998). On November 3, 1998 the people of Hawaii approved a state
constitutional amendment that allows Hawaii's legislature to refuse marriage licenses to
same-sex couples, and a case pending before the Hawaii Supreme Court which seeks to
compel the issuance of such a marriage license is about to start another round of briefing.
See Ellen Goodman, For Gays Seeking Marriage, A Long Wait Before "I Do," Tim Bos-
TON GLOBE, Jan. 3, 1999, at E7. On the same day Alaska's voters approved a state consti-
tutional amendment which limits marriage licenses to heterosexual couples. Meanwhile,
an Alaska state court lawsuit claiming equal protection and privacy violations for gay and
lesbian couples who are denied marriage licenses must be "harmonized" with the new
amendment. See Liz Ruskin, Gay Marriage Ban Approved, ANcIORAGE DAILY NEws,
Nov. 4, 1998, at Al. In Vermont, that state's supreme court recently heard oral argument
in a case which seeks to compel the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples.
Harvard law Professor Lawrence Tribe has described Vermont's legal argument in that
case as "insane." Lois R. Shea, Same Sex Marriage Hopes Go North, Tim BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 17, 1998, at Bi. See generally J. Wiggins, Maine's "Act To Protect Traditional Mar-
riage and Prohibit Same-Sex Marriage: Questions of Constitutionality Under State and Fed-
eral Law, 50 MAiN L. REv. 345, 393-94 (1998).
301. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177 (1992).
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